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Removal and Remand – Beyond the Supplements
Joan Steinman*
For many years I have prepared the annual Pocket Parts and Supplements for volumes
14B and C of WRIGHT, MILLER, COOPER & STEINMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE,
which address the law of removal and remand of cases from state to federal court and back. As
the number of cases in this and many other areas of federal practice and procedure has exploded,
the publishers of the treatise have decided that the treatise should be increasingly selective in
describing new case developments. In order to further assist lawyers, judges, and professors in
their research of the law of removal and remand, I have decided to electronically publish a
compilation of cases and law review articles that either are not included at all in the volume 14B
and C Pocket Parts or are cited there for different propositions than are reflected in this electronic
publication.
The cases that are included in this electronic compilation came to my attention between
mid-October, 2012, and mid-October, 2013. The cases that came to my attention during that
same time period and that I deemed sufficiently noteworthy to include in volumes 14B and C of
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE will appear in the 2014 Pocket Parts.
I. Removal, In General
Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
Reyna v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., 892 F.Supp.2d 829 (W.D.Tex. 2012) (denying
remand, noting that the Rooker–Feldman doctrine applies only to cases brought by state-court
losers who complain of injuries caused by a state-court judgment that was rendered before the
federal district court proceedings commenced and who invite district court review and rejection
of those judgments, and holding that a home equity foreclosure order entered by a Texas state
court did not constitute a final state court judgment, and thus Rooker–Feldman did not bar the
federal district court from asserting diversity jurisdiction over a borrower’s removed action to
restrain its lender from evicting him from the property). With that obstacle eliminated, the court
had jurisdiction, upon removal.
Baker v. Residential Funding Co., LLC, 886 F.Supp.2d 591 (E.D.Mich. 2012)
(remanding a removed case to state court on other grounds, but holding that the Rooker–Feldman
doctrine applies to removed actions as the logic underlying the doctrine, that federal district
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courts lack jurisdiction to review state court judgments, applies equally in the context of removed
actions, but holding that borrowers’ action against the assignee of their mortgage and a law firm
that represented the assignee in foreclosure proceedings was not barred by Rooker–Feldman,
where the borrowers did not seek review of any state court judgment, and the source of their
alleged injury was not the state court judgments entered in foreclosure proceedings, but rather
defendants’ allegedly improper actions in foreclosing without a valid assignment of the mortgage
and in seeking to evict borrowers from their home).
Sovereign Immunity
Kozaczek v. N.Y. Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 503 Fed.Appx. 60 (2d Cir. 2012)
(remanding to state court, holding that the New York Higher Education Services Corporation
(HESC) did not waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity in an action removed to federal court
where HESC had not been properly served at the time a co-defendant removed the case, and
therefore did not consent to removal, nor did it waive its immunity by filing motions to dismiss).
Waiver of the Right to Remove
Fastmetrix, Inc. v. ITT Corp., 924 F.Supp.2d 668 (E.D.Va. 2013) (remanding to state
court, holding in the alternative that the parties’ forum selection clause rested jurisdiction
exclusively in the courts of Virginia, and that defendant waived its right to remove by agreeing to
that provision).
Waiver of the Right to Remand
Johnson v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 900 F.Supp.2d 1310 (M.D.Fla. 2012) (remanding to state
court, holding in part that defendant failed to carry its burden to establish that the plaintiff
insureds waived their right to seek remand to state court of their breach of contract action against
their insurer, where the insureds filed a case management report in federal court, sought
mediation, and requested the identity of the insurer’s corporate representative in order to depose
him, as the insureds filed a motion to remand three days after the insurer filed its notice of
removal, the case management report was mandated by the court, insureds sought mediation
before the notice of removal was filed, and they merely sought to bring their deposition notice to
the insurer’s corporate representative into conformity with the federal rule governing notice of
depositions). The court cited the principle that substantial doubts as to the propriety of the
removal should be resolved against federal jurisdiction.
No Waiver of Defenses
Nat’l Union Fire Ins. v. American Eurocopter Corp., 692 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2012) (noting
that district court granted a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, after removal).
Ballew v. Roundpoint Mortgage Servicing Corp., 491 Fed.Appx. 25 (11th Cir. 2012)
(upholding dismissal of removed suit for failure of plaintiff to perfect service of process,
reasoning in part that district court was not required to determine its subject-matter jurisdiction

over removed suit prior to ruling on whether suit should be dismissed because of plaintiffs’
failure to perfect service of process, where valid service was a prerequisite to federal court’s
assertion of personal jurisdiction over the defendants).
In re Facebook, Inc., IPO Securities and Derivative Litig., 922 F.Supp.2d 445 (S.D.N.Y.
2013) (denying motions to remand as moot and dismissing complaints after removal, based on
improper venue by virtue of a forum-selection clause, lack of standing and claims not being ripe,
matters that the court decided before addressing plaintiffs’ motion to remand for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction in removed case, noting that the court had discretion to dismiss a case on the
basis of such threshold issues before resolving questions of subject-matter jurisdiction, and
concluding that convenience, efficiency and judicial economy warranted prior consideration of
the identified threshold issues because they would have had to be adjudicated even in state court,
on remand, and deciding the issues in the multi-district litigation avoided duplication and
potentially conflicting rulings). The action also illustrated transfer after removal, as the case had
been transferred for pre-trial pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1407.
Brinkman v. Bank of America, N.A., 914 F.Supp.2d 984 (D. Minn. 2012) (denying
remand to state court, holding in part that prior-exclusive-jurisdiction doctrine did not bar the
federal district court’s exercise of jurisdiction over a homeowners’ action against mortgage loan
servicers, seeking to challenge the validity of mortgages in an effort to prevent foreclosures, as
the servicers’ Minnesota state court eviction actions were in personam, rather than in rem,
actions).
Marx Industries, Inc. v. Chestnut Ridge Foam, Inc., 903 F.Supp.2d 358 (W.D.N.C. 2012 )
(entertaining, but rejecting, post-removal challenge to personal jurisdiction).
Rissman Hendricks & Oliverio, LLP v. MIV Therapeutics Inc., 901 F.Supp.2d 255
(D.Mass. 2012) (denying remand, holding that defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction in
the forum state and that service effected on former corporate client’s former officer was
sufficient, in removed action seeking recovery of unpaid legal fees, where plaintiff served officer
by mail service, which was accepted and signed for at his last known address in Canada, and by
e-mail with receipt confirmation, pursuant to a state-court order obtained prior to removal).
Molex Co., LLC v. Andres, 887 F.Supp.2d 1189 (N.D.Ala. 2012) (denying remand of a
removed action alleging violation of the Alabama Trade Secrets Act and breach of fiduciary duty;
entertaining defendant’s contentions that the federal court lacked personal jurisdiction over him
and that service of the complaint and summons were improper, but rejecting those contentions).
Karnatcheva v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 871 F.Supp.2d 834 (D. Minn. 2012)
(upholding removal and dismissing suit, holding in part that removal divested the state court of
in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction over property, and thus the federal district court did not lack
jurisdiction over a removed action challenging foreclosure proceedings simply because the case
originated in state court; also, an eviction action against one mortgagor in state court was
commenced after the action challenging foreclosure proceedings was filed and removed to
federal court, and thus the eviction action was not a basis for prior exclusive jurisdiction in state

court).
Samson Tug and Barge Co., Inc. v. Koziol, 869 F.Supp.2d 1001 (D.Alaska 2012)
(entertaining, but rejecting, defendant’s post-removal motions to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction and improper venue, and refusing to transfer to a different federal district court).
McCoy v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 858 F.Supp.2d 639, 652 (S.D.W.Va. 2012) (denying
remand to state court of landowner’s action against railroad, seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief with respect to alleged easement-by-implication and easement-by-necessity, concluding
that court had diversity jurisdiction; also entertaining and upholding defendant railroad’s
objection to service of process, holding that, under West Virginia law, landowner’s service of
process on agent of railroad’s subsidiary did not constitute valid service of process on railroad,
where railroad had not been authorized to transact business within West Virginia, and parent had
not exercised sufficient degree of control over subsidiary, citing 4A Wright & Miller for state
law governing proper effectuation of pre-removal service of process).
Compare
McPhearson v. Anderson, 874 F.Supp.2d 573 (E.D.Va. 2012) (post-removal, directing
judgment in favor of Anderson, holding that while the court would entertain a post-removal
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the federal district court had personal
jurisdiction over a county police officer in an arrestee’s action alleging false imprisonment under
§ 1983 and Virginia law, even though the officer had not yet been properly served with process,
as the 120-day time period to effectuate service under the relevant federal civil rule had not yet
passed, and prior to removing case, officer had effectively waived his right to contest personal
jurisdiction or service under Virginia law by asserting a defense in the special plea that he filed
with the Virginia court; further holding that while the court would entertain a post-removal
motion to dismiss for lack of proper venue, the removal statute, rather than the general venue
statute, determined whether venue was proper in federal district court following removal of this
action from Virginia state court suit, and since defendant removed to the district court embracing
the state court where the action was filed, venue was proper).
With respect to matters that relate to removal generally, see:
Cottone, Michael A., Here Comes Celotex ... McDonnell Douglas: The New Tennessee Summary
Judgment Standard and Removal Considerations for Organizational Clients, 14 TRANSACTIONS
253 (2013).
II. Removal Based on Federal Question Jurisdiction
In general
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Nowakowski, 861 F.Supp.2d 866 (W.D.Mich. 2012) (remanding to
state court, holding that no-fault auto insurer’s claim against insured motorist, seeking
declaratory judgment that it was not obligated to indemnify insured against liability for claim

asserted by insured’s primary health plan, did not seek declaratory relief on a matter for which
the insured could bring a coercive action arising under federal law against the insurer, and thus
removal of action was not permitted, even if insurer’s contractual obligations were contingent on
the validity of the plan administrator’s subrogation lien, where the contingency had been unlikely
to occur, quoting 10B Wright, Miller & Kane).
Pacheco v. St. Luke’s Emergency Associates, P.C., 879 F.Supp.2d 136 (D.Mass. 2012)
(denying remand to state court, holding that a case in which plaintiff asserted claims arising
under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act and state law claims within the federal courts’
supplemental jurisdiction was properly removed to federal court; the former employee’s FLSA
claims against a hospital were not derived from his employment agreement, did not depend on
his employment contract, nor did the resolution of plaintiff’s FLSA claims relate to interpretation
of his employment contract, and therefore they were not governed by the forum-selection clause - choosing certain state courts – in his employment agreement; finally, even if the forumselection clause had applied, such a clause does not deprive a court of subject-matter jurisdiction
over a case). The court rejected the contention that the state law claims should be remanded as
separate and independent from the federal question claims and saw no reason to decline to
exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over them.
May v. Apache Corp., 870 F.Supp.2d 454 (S.D.Tex. 2012) (denying remand to state court
of plaintiff’s federal question claim in property owners’ action against oil and gas company,
alleging that company’s drilling activities violated Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), a federal statute, but remanding plaintiff’s state law
claims, in the exercise of the court’s discretion under the supplemental jurisdiction statute,
despite the court’s exclusive jurisdiction over the CERCLA claim).
Compare
Gardiner v. St. Croix Dist. Governing Bd. of Directors, 859 F.Supp.2d 728 (D.Virgin
Islands 2012) (remanding to state court, holding in part that doctor’s claim under Virgin Islands
law that revocation of his medical privileges by hospital and various officials breached their
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by failing to provide him with the process stated
in hospital by-laws did not raise a federal question, despite defendants’ contentions that the
claim asserted Fourteenth Amendment due process violations; the claim was based solely on
Virgin Islands law and made no reference to federal law).
In re Halo Wireless, Inc., 872 F.Supp.2d 558 (W.D.Tex. 2012) (remanding to state court,
holding that district court lacked federal-question jurisdiction under the Federal
Telecommunications Act (FTA) over a removed dispute between incumbent local exchange
carriers and a purported commercial-radio-service carrier, regarding interconnection agreements,
absent a prior determination by the state public utility commission, as – with respect to
interconnection agreements -- federal-question jurisdiction is limited under the FTA to the
review of state commission rulings).
Sheehan v. Broadband Access Services, Inc., 889 F.Supp.2d 284 (D.R.I. 2012)

(remanding to state court, holding that employee’s claim under Rhode Island statute regulating
employer drug testing did not arise under federal law; the Federal Employee Omnibus
Transportation Employee Testing Act (FOTETA) did not provide a private remedy for the
employee, and its invocation by the defendant employer did not raise a substantial federal
question; a federal defense does not confer “arising under” jurisdiction).
Mostofi v. Capital One, N.A., 925 F.Supp.2d 747 (D.Md. 2013) (remanding to state
court, holding that, under state law, plaintiff’s third amended complaint was effective when it
was filed in Maryland trial court although plaintiffs did not file a red-lined copy of the amended
complaint in which the stricken material and new material were properly identified, and that the
third amended complaint – which contained no claims arising under federal law – was operative
at the time of removal where the removal notice was filed about three hours after the third
amended complaint was filed). Thus, the federal court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the
case.
Federal Issues Held Insufficient to Ground Removal
Fifth Circuit
Hearn v. Reynolds, 876 F.Supp.2d 798 (S.D.Miss. 2012) (remanding to state court,
holding that patient’s invocation of HIPAA in complaint alleging that doctor published
documents that had been filed under seal in a prior state-court proceeding did not give rise to
federal question jurisdiction upon removal, since HIPAA had not a created private right of
action, the complaint’s allusion to HIPAA had been in a fleeting observation rather than by way
of an attempt to state a claim, and the patient had mentioned HIPAA in the complaint only
because it had been the source of his allegedly reasonable expectation that the documents would
be kept private).
Ninth Circuit
Boxer v. Accuray Inc., 906 F.Supp.2d 1012 (N.D.Cal. 2012) (remanding to state court,
holding that federal district court lacked federal question jurisdiction over a removed class action
asserting breach of fiduciary duty by a corporation’s board members in connection with
shareholder proposals relating to executive compensation and a proposed increase in total
authorized shares of stock, neither of which, plaintiff claimed, were adequately described in the
corporation’s proxy statement, where there was no showing that a violation of the Dodd–Frank
Act with respect to disclosures in a proxy statement was a prerequisite to a finding of materiality
or to a board member’s breach of fiduciary duty under Delaware law, and no federal law
controlled the challenge to the disclosures pertaining to increased stock shares).
Wanamaker v. Lawson, 871 F.Supp.2d 735 (E.D.Tenn. 2012) (remanding to state court,
holding that plaintiffs’ contract and tort claims against insurance agency and agent related to crop
losses did not involve substantial questions of federal law).
Finley v. Kondaur Capital Corp., 909 F.Supp.2d 969 (W.D.Tenn. 2012) (remanding to

state court, holding that mortgagee’s unlawful detainer lawsuit, filed in state court against
mortgagor, was based entirely on Tennessee law, unlike mortgagor’s lawsuit that was pending in
federal district court against the mortgagee for alleged violation of federal and state law, thus
precluding removal of the unlawful detainer lawsuit, which lacked a substantial federal question;
the fact that the same property that the mortgagor allegedly unlawfully detained was subject to
proceedings in federal court did not cause this suit to “arise under” federal law; one suit could not
be supplemental to another).
The Effect of Plaintiff’s Choice of Theories and Remedies
Noel v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank N.A., 918 F.Supp.2d 123 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (remanding
to state court, holding that court lacked federal-question jurisdiction over this action, removed
from New York state court, in which an employee asserted state-law claims against his employer
for gender discrimination and retaliation, reasoning that even if the retaliation claim was based
on the employer’s response to the employee’s filing of a gender discrimination complaint with
the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), Title VII did not preempt state
anti-discrimination law and the EEOC complaint opposed a practice forbidden by state as well as
federal law, thus the retaliation claim that did not require resolution of any federal question).
The court noted that where a plaintiff’s claim potentially involves both a federal ground and a
state ground, the plaintiff is free to pitch his claim solely on the state ground, except when federal
law completely preempts an entire field or when the plaintiff omits a federal question essential to
resolution of his claim. The court invited plaintiff to seek costs and attorney’s fees under 28
U.S.C.A. § 1447(c).
Praschak v. Kmart Corp., 922 F.Supp.2d 710 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (remanding to state court,
holding that court lacked federal question jurisdiction over customer’s suit, alleging that retailer
and construction company were negligent in failing to comply with public accommodation
provisions of the federal Americans with disabilities Act (ADA) and in performing construction
work that blocked-off handicapped-accessible parking spaces, where the customer had no remedy
for damages under the ADA, the complaint’s reference to the ADA was only an alternative basis
for liability as the customer also alleged that defendants owed her a duty of reasonable care
arising from Illinois common law, and recognition of federal jurisdiction would lead to the shift
of a great number of cases into federal court).
Gardiner v. St. Croix Dist. Governing Bd. of Directors, 859 F.Supp.2d 728 (D.Virgin
Islands 2012) (remanding to state court, holding in part that violation of plaintiff’s Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights and breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
were independent theories of recovery under federal and Virgin Islands law, respectively, in
support of one claim, and therefore, doctor’s claim of wrongful termination under Virgin Islands
law, asserted against hospital and various officials, did not provide a basis for federal question
jurisdiction, as doctor could prevail on the claim under the Virgin Islands theory for reasons
completely unrelated to the alleged constitutional violation).
Supplemental jurisdiction

Fourth Circuit
Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head, 863 F.Supp.2d 495 (E.D.N.C. 2012) (declining to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims brought by owners of oceanfront
cottages against town, arising from town’s efforts to demolish cottages following storm, where
court had either granted summary judgment on or dismissed all federal claims, the case involved
important and potentially far-reaching state-law issues as to which little precedent existed, and
the remaining claims concerned land-use regulations, which state court had more experience
resolving).
Fifth Circuit
Oliver v. Lewis, 891 F.Supp.2d 839 (S.D.Tex. Aug 2012) (remanding to state court
candidate’s action against State political party officials, seeking a declaratory judgment that the
political party’s rules did not permit the party officials to refuse to place candidate’s name on the
general election ballot, reasoning that the action was properly removed by virtue of the court’s
federal question jurisdiction because the action, at removal, asserted voters’ claims that the
refusal violated their federal constitutional rights, but that because plaintiff’s voluntarily
dismissed the voters’ claims after removal and no basis for federal question jurisdiction existed –
as the candidate’s claims did not necessarily depend on the resolution of any federal issue – the
court had discretion to remand the state law claims and would do so as the case raised novel
state-law issues, and few federal judicial resources had been devoted to the suit).
May v. Apache Corp., 870 F.Supp.2d 454 (S.D.Tex. 2012) (denying remand to state court
of plaintiff’s federal question claim in property owners’ action against oil and gas company,
alleging that company’s drilling activities violated Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), a federal statute, where that claim was ripe, but
remanding plaintiff’s state law claims, in the exercise of the court’s discretion under the
supplemental jurisdiction statute, despite the court’s exclusive jurisdiction over the CERCLA
claim, where CERCLA was a strict liability statute with straightforward issues tried to the bench,
owners were entitled to jury trial on the state law claims, state law claims involved plethora of
issues unrelated to CERCLA liability, action was originally filed in state court, and CERCLA
claim was not shown to be substantial in relation to the state law claims).
Sixth Circuit
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Nowakowski, 861 F.Supp.2d 866, 872 (W.D.Mich. 2012) (remanding
to state court, holding that no-fault auto insurer’s claim against insured motorist, seeking
declaratory judgment that it was not obligated to indemnify insured against liability for claim
asserted by insured’s primary health plan, did not seek declaratory relief on a matter for which
the insured could bring coercive action arising under federal law against the insurer, and thus
removal of action was not permitted; further, that district court lacked supplemental jurisdiction
over the no-fault automobile insurer’s removed declaratory judgment claim against the insured
motorist, using defendant’s third-party claim as the anchor claim; the latter could not support
federal question jurisdiction and hence could not anchor supplemental jurisdiction).

Seventh Circuit
Piekosz-Murphy v. Board of Educ. of Community High School Dist. No. 230, 858
F.Supp.2d 952 (N.D.Ill. 2012) (remanding to state court high school student’s request for a writ
of common law certiorari under Illinois law for the purpose of reviewing the school’s
disciplinary decision against him, where student’s action had been removed solely on the basis of
federal question jurisdiction, the student’s constitutional claims had been dismissed, and the only
remaining count from the complaint was the state law claim).
D.C. Circuit
Alraee v. Board of Trustees of University of Dist. of Columbia, 889 F.Supp.2d 73
(D.D.C. 2012) (having dismissed former university professor’s sole federal claim, declining to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his breach of contract and tort claims because they raised
novel or complex issues of D.C. law, and remanding those claims to the Superior Court from
which they had been removed).
D.C. Professional Taxicab Drivers Ass'n v. District of Columbia, 880 F.Supp.2d 67
(D.D.C. 2012) (having dismissed all federal claims over which it had original jurisdiction – one
by virtue of voluntary dismissal by plaintiff and the other as moot --, declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over remaining claims, which arose under District of Columbia law).
However, the court erroneously stated that it was remanding for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction.
Cannon v. District of Columbia, 873 F.Supp.2d. 272 (D.D.C. 2012) (remanding to
District of Columbia Superior Court remaining non-federal claims in removed action where all
federal claims had been dismissed, as remaining claims raised novel and complex issues of
District law).
Compare
Finley v. Kondaur Capital Corp., 909 F.Supp.2d 969 (W.D.Tenn. 2012) (remanding to
state court, holding that mortgagee’s unlawful detainer lawsuit, filed in state court against
mortgagor, was based entirely on Tennessee law, unlike mortgagor’s lawsuit that was pending in
federal district court against the mortgagee for alleged violation of federal and state law, thus
precluding removal of the unlawful detainer lawsuit, which lacked a substantial federal question;
the fact that the same property that the mortgagor allegedly unlawfully detained was subject to
proceedings in federal court did not cause this suit to “arise under” federal law; one suit could not
be supplemental to another).
With respect to removals based on federal question jurisdiction, see generally:
Field, Martha, Removal Reform : A Solution for Federal Question Jurisdiction, Forum Shopping,
and Duplicative State-Federal Litigation, 88 IND. L. J. 611 (2013).

Wojcicki, Paul E., and Joseph F. Kampherstein, III, “Make a Federal Case Out of It,” FOR THE
DEFENSE, Dec. 2012, at 16.
Cases Whose Removability Depends on Application of the Grable & Sons case
– Cases coming out against jurisdiction
Praschak v. Kmart Corp., 922 F.Supp.2d 710 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (remanding to state court,
holding that court lacked federal question jurisdiction over customer’s suit, alleging that retailer
and construction company were negligent in failing to comply with public accommodation
provisions of the federal Americans with disabilities Act (ADA) and in performing construction
work that blocked-off handicapped-accessible parking spaces, where the customer had no remedy
for damages under the ADA, the complaint’s reference to the ADA was only an alternative basis
for liability as the customer also alleged that defendants owed her a duty of reasonable care
arising from Illinois common law, and recognition of federal jurisdiction would lead to the shift
of a great number of cases into federal court).
CPC Livestock, LLC v. Fifth Third Bank, Inc., 495 B.R. 332 (W.D. Ky. 2013) (rejecting
federal question jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction, upholding “related to” bankruptcy
jurisdiction over a removed action, but nonetheless remanding to state court under both
mandatory and permissive abstention doctrines). The court held that an action by cattle producers
and others against a lender and principals for a livestock brokerage company and stockyard did
not involve a substantial federal interest, where the bankruptcy trustee was administering claims
against company’s bond, required by the agency that administers the federal Packers and
Stockyards Act (PSA), and the main federal issue of whether a PSA trust relationship existed
merely required interpretation of regulations, and resolution of any PSA issue would not
necessarily conclude the action and would be pertinent only to the facts of the instant case. The
district court would not risk upsetting the intended balance between federal and state courts by
exercising federal question jurisdiction.
Maitland v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Ins. Co., 914 F.Supp.2d 794 (E.D. La. 2012)
(remanding to state court, holding that the federal district court lacked federal question
jurisdiction over this removed action, which had been brought against an insurance agency and
its agents by a former insurance agent’s widow who inherited her husband’s flood-policy
business and asserted claims for violation of Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act and Louisiana
antitrust laws, as well as claims of property interests and breach of contract arising from
defendants’ alleged conversion of policies, where the widow asserted only state-law claims, and
although the flood policies in question were created and administered by the federal National
Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), the central dispute was legal ownership of the policy business,
which was a matter of state law). Although federal courts have exclusive subject-matter
jurisdiction in cases arising out of policy-holders’ claims under flood insurance policies issued
pursuant to the NFIP, this was not such a case and none of the claims required the resolution of a
substantial question of federal law.
Cooper v. Int’l Paper Co., 912 F.Supps.2d 1307 (S.D.Ala. 2012) (remanding to state

court, holding that city residents’ action against paper mill, alleging that operation of the mill
caused the emission of hazardous substances and noxious odors, in violation of federal and state
laws, and asserting state-law claims did not raise a substantial issue of federal law sufficient to
confer federal question jurisdiction where, although the complaint provided a laundry list of
federal statutes and regulations, the claims arose under state law, plaintiffs failed to raise any
issue concerning the construction of federal laws and made no showing that the claims turned on
any actually disputed or substantial issue of federal law; many of the federal laws listed in the
complaint contained savings clauses, preserving parties’ state law rights).
Goffney v. Bank of America, N.A., 897 F.Supp.2d 520 (S.D.Tex. 2012) (remanding to
state court for lack of federal question jurisdiction, holding that federal law was not necessary to
resolve a mortgagor’s state law claims against a mortgagee for breach of contract and violations
of Texas’s Debt Collection Act (TDCA), despite defendant’s contention that federal question
jurisdiction existed because the mortgagor alleged that the foreclosure and subsequent sale of
her home violated the federal Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) and Home
Affordable Foreclosure Alternative (HAFA) program). Although the mortgagor’s claims related
to HAMP and HAFA, the claims did not “arise under” federal law because the mortgagor did not
allege claims under either HAMP or HAFA and, with respect to the state law claims that plaintiff
asserted, any dispute as to whether the foreclosure and subsequent sale of the mortgagor’s home
violated HAMP and HAFA did not raise a substantial federal question where Congress had
decided not to provide a private right of action under HAMP or HAFA, the lack of such a private
right of action indicated that Congress did not intend to alter the balance of federal and state
judicial responsibilities in mortgage foreclosure litigation, and the federal government did not
appear to have a strong interest in resolving this issue between lenders and borrowers).
Rayburn v. Mississippi Dev. Auth., 877 F.Supp.2d 494 (S.D.Miss. 2012) (remanding to
state court, holding that property claims by developers and builders that Mississippi
Development Authority (MDA) violated the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA) by arbitrarily
and capriciously interpreting MDA and federal regulations related to MDA’s programs in
partnership with the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) failed to
present a substantial disputed federal question sufficient to support federal jurisdiction upon
removal where the suit was brought under the MTCA and concerned its interpretation, federal
regulations were only tangentially relevant, and federal jurisdiction would disturb the balance of
federal and state judicial responsibilities).
Skymont Farms v. North, 862 F.Supp.2d 755 (E.D.Tenn. 2012) (remanding to state court,
holding that insureds’ state law claims against an insurance agency and its agents, alleging
negligence in failing to properly obtain an insurance policy for insureds’ nursery and in failing to
obtain the information from the insureds necessary to secure appropriate coverage, did not
present a substantial question of federal law; analysis of the state law claims would focus on
factual matters, and little, if any, federal law would impact resolution of the case).
Gardiner v. St. Croix Dist. Governing Bd. of Directors, 859 F.Supp.2d 728 (D.Virgin
Islands 2012) (remanding to state court, holding in part that reference to federal mail and wire
fraud statutes, in doctor’s claim that hospital and various officials violated the Virgin Islands

Criminally Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (CICO), was a reference to predicate acts, and
claim therefore did not arise under federal law; whether defendants violated federal statutes was
in dispute but interpretation of federal statutes was not, and federal criminal laws were
incorporated into CICO statute such that federal laws could be used routinely as predicate
offenses; relying on the principle that a plaintiff’s mere inclusion of federal criminal laws as
predicate acts in their state-created RICO claims does not raise substantial questions of federal
law; also concluding that to interpret “arising under” to embrace this case would disrupt the
congressionally approved balance between the state and federal judiciaries).
With respect to removals based on the theory of Grable & Sons, Inc., see generally:
McKuskey, Elizabeth Y., Clarity and Clarification: Grable Federal Questions in the Eyes of
their Beholders, 91 NEB. L. REV. 387 (2012).
The Insufficiency of Federal Defenses as a Basis for Removal
First Circuit
Sheehan v. Broadband Access Services, Inc., 889 F.Supp.2d 284 (D.R.I. 2012)
(remanding to state court, holding that employee’s claim under Rhode Island statute regulating
employer drug testing did not arise under federal law; the Federal Employee Omnibus
Transportation Employee Testing Act (FOTETA) did not provide a private remedy for the
employee, and its invocation by the defendant employer did not raise a substantial federal
question; a federal defense does not confer “arising under” jurisdiction).
Second Circuit
Isufi v. Prometal Const., Inc., 927 F.Supp.2d 50 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (ordering remand to
state court, holding in part that the fact that the employer could potentially assert that the Davis
Bacon Act defensively preempted the employees’ claims did not raise a disputed and substantial
question of federal law that could ground removal, as federal defenses cannot be grounds for
removal under § 1441).
Speranza v. Leonard, 925 F.Supp.2d 266 (D.Conn. 2013) (remanding to state court,
rejecting defendant’s contention that its petition for exoneration from or limitation of liability
provided a ground for removal, as it was a response to the complaint, and a responsive pleading
cannot create federal subject-matter jurisdiction supporting removal because the federal question
must appear on the face of a properly pleaded complaint).
BGC Partners, Inc. v. Avison Young (Canada), Inc., 919 F.Supp.2d 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(remanding to state court, holding in part that a New York brokerage’s lawsuit against a
Canadian brokerage and its affiliates, asserting various state law claims including tortious
interference with contractual relationships and poaching of brokers and business opportunities
from a bankrupt brokerage that was purchased by the New York brokerage, did not fall within
federal court’s jurisdiction by virtue of the Canadian brokerage’s ability to assert a defense that

plaintiff’s claims were preempted by bankruptcy proceedings nor on the basis that plaintiff’s
claims related to bankruptcy proceedings; further holding that, if the suit did fall within “related
to” bankruptcy jurisdiction, the district court was required to abstain for a combination of
reasons).
Fourth Circuit
Campbell v. Hampton Roads Bankshares, Inc., 925 F.Supp.2d 800 (E.D.Va. 2013)
(remanding to state court, holding that employer’s argument that it was prohibited by federal
regulations from fulfilling its alleged contractual obligation under Virginia law to pay severance
to a terminated bank employee could not support removal of the former employee’s state law
breach of employment contract action; a contrary holding would be inconsistent with the
principle that federal jurisdiction cannot rest on a defense).
West Virginia ex rel. McGraw v. Fast Auto Loans, Inc., 918 F.Supp.2d 551 (N.D.W.Va.
2013) (remanding to state court, holding in part that West Virginia attorney general’s consumer
protection claims against an out-of-state lender who had made automobile title loans to West
Virginia consumers did not “arise under federal law” so as to confer federal-question jurisdiction
over the lender’s removed suit, despite the lender’s assertion that the claims were completely
preempted by and conflicted with the Commerce Clause and that the case involved
extraterritorial application of West Virginia law, because there was no federal controversy: the
AG sought only to enforce state statutes regarding collection activities occurring within its
borders, the lender’s federal defense alone was insufficient to support removal, and any federal
question that might have existed had been rendered moot by vacation of a state court injunction).
Removal Based on Complete Preemption
Completely Preempted Claims as Necessarily Federal
Eighth Circuit
Johnson v. MFA Petroleum Co., 701 F.3d 243 (8th Cir. 2012).
Eleventh Circuit
Karns v. Disability Reinsurance Management Services, Inc., 879 F.Supp.2d 1298
(N.D.Ala. 2012).
Completely Preempted Claims are Re-characterized as Federal
Karns v. Disability Reinsurance Management Services, Inc., 879 F.Supp.2d 1298
(N.D.Ala. 2012).
ERISA Complete Preemption

Ninth Circuit
Poffenbarger v. Hawai’i Management Alliance Ass’n, 892 F.Supp.2d 1288 (D.Hawai’i
2012) (denying remand to state court, holding that an employee’s claims that necessarily
referenced an ERISA-governed plan, were expressly preempted, where one claim posed the
question whether an insurer was entitled to cancel plaintiff’s plan or challenged the manner in
which the insurer canceled the plan and another claim alleged insurance bad faith). The court
also reasoned that where the existence of an ERISA plan is a critical factor in establishing
liability, the claim is expressly preempted, and concluded on this basis that plaintiff’s claims for
bad faith, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and vicarious
liability all were expressly preempted because they were based upon interference with attainment
of ERISA benefits. Similarly, although plaintiff’s negligent infliction of emotional distress
claim did not allege damages based on loss of insurance benefits, the plaintiff had to allege the
existence of an ERISA-governed plan to state that claim, so it too was expressly preempted.
Finally, neither Hawa’'i common law governing bad faith, fiduciary duty, contract,
misrepresentation, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and vicarious liability, nor state
antitrust statutes were specifically directed toward entities engaged in insurance, and thus the
claims based on those causes of action were not subject to ERISA’s savings clause. The court
seemed not to clearly distinguish between express and complete preemption, but its reasoning
and conclusion that some of the claims were necessarily federal indicated that it held some of
plaintiff’s claims to be completely preempted by ERISA.
Tenth Circuit
Sawyer v. USAA Ins. Co., 912 F.Supp.2d 1118 (D.N.M. 2012) (ruling on motion to
dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies a case removed as completely preempted
by ERISA, reasoning that removing defendants must establish congressional intent to extinguish
similar state claims by making a federal cause of action exclusive, and holding that ERISA
completely preempted a plan participant’s claims against the administrator of an employee
benefit plan, asserting breach of contract, insurance bad faith, and violation of the New Mexico
Unfair Insurance Practices Act, the participant’s claim that her former employer and its
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) administrator negligently
misrepresented to plaintiff that premiums she paid were sufficient to allow her health coverage to
continue, and her claims arising from the denial of benefits under the employee benefit plan,
even though state law permitted awards of consequential and punitive damages, but ERISA did
not).
Eleventh Circuit
Karns v. Disability Reinsurance Management Services, Inc., 879 F.Supp.2d 1298
(N.D.Ala. 2012) (denying remand to state court, holding that ERISA completely preempted an
insured’s breach-of-contract claim against an insurer and claims administrator, arising from their
allegedly wrongful termination of plaintiff’s long-term disability benefits, where the insured’s
plan was governed by ERISA, she had standing to sue under the plan, the parties’ sole
relationship was premised on their respective roles as participant, claims administrator, and

insurer of the plan, the insured sought to recover long-term disability benefits under the plan, and
her position as a public school teacher did not defeat complete ERISA preemption).
With respect to removals based upon complete preemption, see generally:
Lindsay, Mark, Complete Preemption and Copyright: Toward a Successive Analysis, 20 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 43 (2012).
Cases Rejecting the Argument of Complete Preemption by ERISA
Fourth Circuit
Feldman's Medical Center Pharmacy, Inc. v. CareFirst, Inc., 902 F.Supp.2d 771 (D.Md.
2012) (remanding to state court a specialty pharmacy’s suit alleging that a health insurance
provider destroyed its business by withholding payments on reimbursement claims, instigating
frivolous investigations, spreading false rumors, and encouraging pharmacy customers to fill
their prescriptions elsewhere, because these claims were not completely preempted by ERISA,
where the pharmacy was not seeking to recover for harm to ERISA plan beneficiaries or
participants, and was not seeking benefits under patients’ ERISA plans or damages equal to the
amount of reimbursement claims submitted under the terms of an ERISA plan).
Fifth Circuit
Nixon v. Vaughn, 904 F.Supp.2d 553 (W.D.La. 2012) (remanding to state court, holding
that beneficiary’s removed lawsuit, claiming that her co-beneficiary sister fraudulently converted
plaintiff’s 401(k) funds from an ERISA-governed employee retirement and savings plan and that
employer and plan administrator negligently failed to inform plaintiff her sister’s actions, was not
completely preempted by ERISA, since a claim for benefits under ERISA would not afford
plaintiff the relief she requested in her complaint, which asserting negligence claims seeking
money damages rather than equitable relief, and since plaintiff did not allege that her employer
and the plan administrator refused her request for plan information or that the plan as a whole
was compromised by the failure to disclose material information).
Seventh Circuit
Perl v. Laux/Arnold, Inc., 864 F.Supp.2d 731 (N.D.Ind. 2012) (resolving doubts in favor
of remand and remanding to state court, holding that removed claims by former employees,
alleging that former employer deducted money from their paychecks for vacation, holiday, work
clothing, apprenticeship, and training benefits without a valid wage assignment and placed some
of those funds into a trust fund administered by the company’s benefit program, in violation of
Indiana law, could not properly be recharacterized as ERISA claims, regardless of whether the
benefit program was a plan covered by ERISA, because the claims were not completely
preempted by ERISA, as the employees did not assert that they did not receive benefits to which
they were entitled under the ERISA plan or that the deductions from their wages did not comply
with ERISA or the terms of the plan, and the claims did not require interpretation of plan

documents; also holding that plaintiffs’ removed claims, alleging that their total compensation
for certain public-works construction projects fell short of the common construction wages
mandated by Indiana statutory law were not completely preempted by ERISA because those
claims did not have any connection with ERISA plans and plaintiffs did not assert that they were,
in this manner, improperly denied any benefits under an ERISA plan; finally, holding that
plaintiffs’ removed claim requesting an accounting of the trust fund administered by their former
employer’s company benefit program was not completely preempted by ERISA, where the claim
was a tool to trace wages allegedly deducted from plaintiffs’ paychecks without authorization, in
violation of Indiana law, and no interpretation of plan documents was necessary to decision).
Ninth Circuit
Borreani v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 875 F.Supp.2d 1050 (N.D.Cal. 2012)
(remanding to state court, holding that there was no need to construe ERISA plan language or
determine the breadth of the plan’s terms in a removed action by relatives of a deceased
participant, against a provider of medical services, where plaintiffs asserted misrepresentation,
fraud, and negligent failure to warn regarding a prescription, and therefore the claims were not
completely preempted by ERISA, where the relatives did not seek to recover benefits or enforce
ERISA rights, but merely asserted tort claims arising from alleged negligence in maintaining
drug formularies and in educating physicians; the relatives’ claims also involved decisions made
in the course of treatment, rather than decisions made in the course of administering the plan, and
therefore, the claims were not expressly preempted by ERISA, where the relatives alleged that
the provider was reckless in its distribution of medication and overall treatment of the
participant, but not that it failed to provide promised benefits).
Tenth Circuit
Potts v. CitiFinancial, Inc., 863 F.Supp.2d 1121 (D.Colo. 2012) (remanding to state court,
holding that former employee lacked standing to pursue ERISA claims, precluding removal on
the basis of complete preemption of his action against his former employer and the administrator
of its medical insurance plan, alleging that, although the employer deducted amounts from
plaintiff’s paycheck to cover medical insurance premiums, it failed to purchase insurance on
plaintiff’s behalf, and asserting claims for breach of contract, bad faith breach of insurance
contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and conversion; plaintiff could not seek to enforce rights under
the plan because he was not a participant in the plan and therefore had no such rights). Further,
former employees have standing to sue under ERISA only if they either have a reasonable
expectation of returning to covered employment or have a colorable claim to vested benefits
under the plan, and plaintiff fell into neither of those categories.
Eleventh Circuit
Mitchell-Hollingsworth Nursing & Rehab., Ctr. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich.,
919 F.Supp.2d 1209 (N.D.Ala. 2013) (remanding to state court, holding that a healthcare
provider’s claims of negligent misrepresentation and estoppel based on oral misrepresentations
were not ERISA claims because they did not arise from the plan or its terms; further holding that

a skilled nursing facility’s claims against insurers for breach of implied contract, negligence,
fraud, promissory fraud, estoppel, quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, conspiracy, and
conversion did not require the court to determine plaintiff’s right to payment under an ERISA
benefits plan and thus the claims were not completely preempted by ERISA; even though the
beneficiary executed an assignment of benefits in favor of one of the insurers, the claims were
not based upon the original agreement between an insurer and the beneficiary, but rather called
upon the court to determine whether either insurer misrepresented the extent of the beneficiary’s
benefits or breached an independent agreement with the facility to provide coverage for the
beneficiary’s care). Mere mention of “covered services” in a the claim against an insurer for
breach of express contract regarding care rendered to an ERISA plan participant did not render
the claim completely preempted where the claim was based on some independent agreement
between the facility and the insurer, not upon an ERISA plan.
Cases Rejecting the Argument of Complete Preemption in Other contexts
Comprehensive Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA)
Weil v. Process Equipment Co. of Tipp City, 879 F.Supp.2d 745 (S.D.Ohio 2012)
(remanding to state court, holding that former chief executive officer (CEO)’s claim that his
employer breached his employment agreement by failing to provide post-separation COBRA
coverage under his compensation plan did not assert a claim to recover damages based on the
employer’s failure to issue a mandatory COBRA notice, but rather alleged only a state law breach
of contract claim, and thus was not completely preempted by federal COBRA, where the CEO
sought to recover severance pay, vacation pay, and reimbursement for his expenses, in addition to
COBRA benefits, and did not seek relief based on any COBRA violation).
Federal Crop Insurance Act
Wanamaker v. Lawson, 871 F.Supp.2d 735 (E.D.Tenn. 2012) (remanding to state court,
holding that Federal Crop Insurance Act (FCIA) did not completely preempt plaintiffs’ removed
contract and tort claims against an insurance agency and agent, related to crop losses, where the
sole federal jurisdictional grants in the FCIA applied only to lawsuits filed against the Secretary
of Agriculture and the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation, there was no jurisdictional grant as to
private insurance companies issuing reinsured policies, their local agencies or agents, and the
provision of FCIA addressing state law invoked preemption only in case of conflicting state law).
Skymont Farms v. North, 862 F.Supp.2d 755 (E.D.Tenn. 2012) (remanding to state court,
holding that the Federal Crop Insurance Act (FCIA) did not completely preempt the field of crop
insurance and thus provided no basis for federal question jurisdiction over a removed suit in
which insureds asserted state law contract and tort claims against a non-diverse local insurance
agency and its agents).
Federal Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act
Sheehan v. Broadband Access Services, Inc., 889 F.Supp.2d 284 (D.R.I. 2012)

(remanding to state court, holding that employee’s claim under Rhode Island statute regulating
employer drug testing could not be re-characterized as a federal claim where the Federal
Employee Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act (FOTETA) did not expressly preempt
the state law claim, nor did FOTETA completely preempt the field).
Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act
B & S Holdings, LLC v. BNSF Ry. Co., 889 F.Supp.2d 1252 (E.D.Wash. 2012) (denying
remand to state court, holding that former adjacent landowner’s removed state law adverse
possession claim against railroad was completely preempted by the Interstate Commerce
Commission Termination Act (ICCTA), as it would interfere with railroad operations and divest
the railroad of the very property on which it conducted its operations).
Labor Management Relations Act
First Circuit
Flores-Flores v. Horizon Lines of Puerto Rico, Inc., 875 F.Supp.2d 90 (D.Puerto Rico
2012) (remanding to state court, holding that unionized employee's claim, alleging that his
employer's refusal to provide him with meal periods violated Puerto Rico's "Law 379," was not
completely preempted by the LMRA, where at the time, meal period regulation formed no part of
the collective bargaining agreement (CBA), resolution of the claim did not depend on the CBA,
and a Puerto Rico statute expressly proscribed modification of the CBA orally or by subsequent
dealings).
Eighth Circuit
Johnson v. Auto Handling Corp., 857 F.Supp.2d 848 (E.D.Mo. 2012) (remanding to state
court, holding that adjudication of worker's action against truck manufacturer and company that
serviced truck, asserting strict liability and negligence leading to injury allegedly sustained while
securing automobiles on truck, did not require interpretation of collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) between employee's union and his employer, and therefore claims were not completely
preempted by the LMRA; truck manufacturer and service company were not party to the
agreement and had no duties imposed by it; rather, duty to manufacture a safe product was
independent of the CBA and owed to the public at large).
Removals Based on Separate and Independent Federal Claims
Cohn v. Charles, 857 F.Supp.2d 544 (D.Md. 2012) (remanding to state court, holding in
part that mortgagor’s counterclaim against substitute trustees in state court foreclosure action and
third-party claims against mortgagee for alleged violation of federal TILA and RESPA could not
reasonably be separate and independent claims, as required for removal of claims arising under
federal law that were joined to trustees’ otherwise non-removable claims for foreclosure, since
the trustees represented interests of the third-party mortgagee in the foreclosure action, so the
trustees and mortgagee were effectively the same).

III. Removal Based on Diversity of Citizenship and Alienage Jurisdiction
The Need for Diversity or Alienage Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(a)
Second Circuit
Mills 2011 LLC v. Synovus Bank, 921 F.Supp.2d 219 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (before the court
would allow jurisdictional discovery, requiring amendment of the notice of removal to allege a
good-faith basis for diversity jurisdiction and a letter brief stating the facts underlying
defendant’s belief in diversity jurisdiction; noting that the citizenship of a limited liability
company (LLC) is determined for purposes of diversity jurisdiction by the citizenship of natural
persons who are members of the LLC and by the place of incorporation and principal place of
business of any corporate entities that are members of the LLC, and that citizenship of a trust is
determined by the citizenship of both the trustees and the beneficiaries; concluding that the
notice of removal failed to adequately allege complete diversity of citizenship, as required for
removal of this breach-of-contract action against the seller of secured loans, by an LLC that
bought the loans, as the citizenship of the trust that was the LLC’s sole member apparently
destroyed diversity because the trust beneficiary and the seller both were citizens of Georgia).
Fourth Circuit
Dooley v. Hartford Acc. and Indem. Co., 892 F.Supp.2d 762 (W.D.Va. 2012) (denying
remand to state court, holding that although the insured and the driver of the other vehicle
involved in an accident both were “residents” of Virginia, the other driver’s citizenship was
irrelevant for purposes of determining diversity of citizenship and the propriety of the removal of
the insured’s action against his insurer, seeking a declaration that his auto insurance policy
afforded him $200,000 in under-insured motorist coverage in connection with the accident,
where the insured did not assert any claim against the other driver or request relief from him).
Heller v. TriEnergy, Inc., 877 F.Supp.2d 414 (N.D.W.Va. 2012) (denying remand to state
court and granting motion to compel arbitration, holding in part that the assignee of an energy
company’s rights, pursuant to an oil and gas lease agreement with property owners, did not have
a real interest in the owners’ action against the company and its assignees, – which favored
finding the assignee to be a nominal party – where the assignee no longer had any rights under
the lease, as it had assigned away all of its rights under the lease, prior to commencement of the
action in state court; further holding that the property owners had no possible claim against the
assignee where plaintiffs’ sole claim against the assignee asserted that it breached a covenant to
diligently and reasonably explore, develop, produce, and market leaseholds but the covenant
allegedly was implied in the lease, but without an alleged breach of an express covenant claim,
the claim was not viable under West Virginia law). This too favored finding the assignee to be a
nominal party, as did the fact that entering judgment in the absence of the assignee would not be
unfair to the property owners, as a subsequent assignee had agreed to pay any judgment on
behalf of itself and the assignee in question, in the event either entity was found liable. The issue
whether the assignee was merely a nominal party arose on the property owners’ motion to

remand the action to state court. The suit alleged breach of covenant, bad faith, fraudulent
inducement, fraud, trespass, tort of outrage, and civil conspiracy.
Fifth Circuit
DTND Sierra Investments LLC v. Bank of America, N.A., 871 F.Supp.2d567 (W.D. Tex.
2012) (upholding removal, examining its jurisdiction sua sponte, holding that a non-diverse
trustee was a nominal party whose citizenship could be disregarded for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction in the high bidder’s removed action against the foreclosing mortgagee, trustee, and
others, seeking an order quieting title and alleging wrongful foreclosure under Texas law, where
the complaint contained no factual allegations against the trustee and sought no relief against the
trustee, the trustee had been named only in his capacity as trustee under a deed of trust, and solely
to enjoin foreclosure).
Sixth Circuit
YA Landholdings, LLC v. Sunshine Energy, KY I, LLC, 871 F.Supp.2d 650 (E.D.Ky.
2012) (remanding to state court, holding in part that sub-tenant, a limited liability company
(LLC) organized under Kentucky law, was not a citizen of Kentucky, as would preclude removal
of forcible detainer actions brought in Kentucky courts by the lessor of commercial gas stations,
alleging that the sub-tenant was in default of the leases, where its sole member was a Kansas
LLC whose sole member was a Florida citizen; for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, a limited
liability company has the citizenship of each of its members; however, the sub-tenant failed to
show that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000).
Eleventh Circuit
St. Joseph Hosp. v. Health Management Associates, Inc., 705 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2013)
(noting that the case was removed based on diversity jurisdiction where defendant was a
Delaware corporation with principal place of business in Florida and plaintiff was incorporated
and had its principal place of business in Georgia).
Auto-Owners Ins .C. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 479 Fed.Appx. 228 (11th Cir. 2012)
(affirming denial of remand and decisions on the merits, holding that suit brought in Florida state
court by the insurer that had issued an executive umbrella policy covering a driver involved in a
collision, against the insurer that insured the vehicle owner under an excess liability policy, after
the excess insurer refused to contribute to a settlement with an injured motorcyclist, was
removable to federal court based on diversity of citizenship, where the excess insurer was
incorporated and had its principal place of business in Ohio, and the umbrella insurer was
incorporated and had its principal place of business in Michigan, despite umbrella insurer’s
argument that because neither insurer was a Florida citizen, neither party would have suffered
local prejudice in state court; further, suit was not a “direct action” under the statutory provision
rendering liability insurers citizens of any state of which their insured was a citizen for purposes
of determining diversity in a direct action against a liability insurer, as the liability could not be
imposed on the insured).

Porter v. Crumpton & Associates, LLC, 862 F.Supp.2d 1303 (M.D.Ala. 2012) (denying
remand to state court, holding in part that a judgment debtor’s professional liability insurer was
not deemed a citizen of the same state as the debtor, as would defeat diversity jurisdiction in
judgment creditors’ removed action, seeking insurance proceeds to satisfy their $250,000
judgment, where the creditors had obtained a state court judgment against the debtor before filing
their action under an Alabama collection statute, and the interests of the creditors and the debtor
were aligned in that they both wanted the insurer to pay the judgment; further holding that,
although the judgment debtor’s professional liability insurer failed to allege the citizenship of all
the debtor’s members, as required to show the citizenship of the limited liability company-debtor,
the insurer’s failure did not warrant remand of the collection action, as the insurer was entitled to
amend its pleadings to cure the defect).
Upon removal, No Properly Joined and Served Defendant May be a Citizen of the Forum
State
Noatex Corp. v. King Const. of Houston, LLC, 864 F.Supp.2d 478 (N.D.Miss. 2012)
(remanding to state court, holding that district court lacked jurisdiction over project owner’s
removed interpleader action concerning funds it owed to a general contractor that were “bound”
by a subcontractor pursuant to Mississippi statutory procedure, where the parties were not
completely diverse, and the subcontractor was a Mississippi citizen, a citizen of the state where
the action was brought).
Removability to be Determined from the Record at Removal
B & S Holdings, LLC v. BNSF Ry. Co., 889 F.Supp.2d 1252 (E.D.Wash. 2012) (denying
remand to state court, looking to facts presented in the removal notice and summary judgmenttype evidence relevant to the amount in controversy at the time of removal, and holding that the
amount in controversy exceeded $75,000, at least from B & S’s perspective, in a former
landowner’s adverse possession action against a railroad, where a contract for the former
landowner’s sale of its property had a holdback provision of $100,000 so as to provide an
incentive for the former landowner to quiet title for the benefit of its successor in interest).
Looking to the diminution in value that would result from the taking, the court concluded that the
value to BNSF could be even greater.
Miller v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 889 F.Supp.2d 980 (N.D.Ohio 2012) (remanding
to state court, reasoning that claims present when a suit is removed but that subsequently are
dismissed from the case – in this case, as time-barred – must be considered in determining
whether the amount-in-controversy requirement for CAFA diversity jurisdiction is satisfied, but
holding nonetheless that defendant vehicle manufacturer did not establish by a preponderance of
the evidence that the amount-in-controversy requirement of CAFA was satisfied in a class action
by purchasers who alleged violations of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act (OCSPA),
breach of warranties, and fraud by concealment in relation to a front bumper assembly, where
approximately 1.5% of potential class members responded to the class notice, the class notice
period had closed, damages were estimated between $850 and $1,500 per class member, the total
damages faced by the manufacturer were $284,750 to $502,500, well below CAFA’s $5 million

threshold, prior to removal the parties had discussed a settlement that would total $2.9 million if
calculated based upon the total potential number of class members, rather than based on those
who responded to the class notice, and there was no evidence that attorneys’ fees available under
OCSPA would put the amount in controversy over $5 million).
Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg, Sales Practices & Prod. Liab Litig., 870 F.Supp.2d
587 (S.D.Ill. 2012) (denying remand to state court, holding in part that district court would not
consider consumer’s post removal amendments to her complaint, in assessing whether pharmacy
had been fraudulently joined and in deciding consumer’s motion to remand her action for
damages, allegedly resulting from the consumer’s use of a prescription drug sold by defendant
pharmacy; the only relevant allegations were those contained in the consumer’s complaint at the
time of removal).
The Volunary-Involuntary Distinction
Arthur Glick Truck Sales, Inc. v. Stuphen East Corp., 914 F.Supp.2d 529 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (approving removal where, by stipulation, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the sole nondiverse defendant, thereby creating complete diversity among the remaining parties).
Court Discretion to Allow or Dis-Allow Post-Removal Joinder of Non-Diverse Parties
First Circuit
Erickson v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 912 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.Mass. 2012) (denying remand
and dismissing claims against a non-diverse general contractor and contractor’s subsidiary who
were joined as defendants post-removal in a construction worker’s negligence suit against a
manufacturer, where the nondiverse defendants were “dispensable” because they were potential
joint tortfeasors whose concurrent negligent actions allegedly contributed to plaintiff’s personal
injury, dismissal would not substantially prejudice any of the parties, the litigation was in an
early stage, and the non-diverse general contractor and its subsidiary would remain in the action
as third party defendants). The court reasoned that if, following removal, a nondiverse defendant
that has been added is dispensable, the court may either remand the case to state court or restore
diversity jurisdiction by dismissing that defendant and, in choosing, the court must consider
whether dismissal will prejudice any of the parties.
Second Circuit
Vanderzalm v. Sechrist Industries, Inc., 875 F.Supp.2d 179 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (remanding
to state court, holding that joinder of a hyperbaric oxygen chamber technician and his hospital
employer as additional defendants in a patient’s products liability suit against the manufacturer of
the device was permissible, even though the patient was asserting different legal claims against
the additional defendants than he asserted against the original defendants, where all claims –
products liability, negligence, and medical malpractice – arose out of the same incident in which
patient was injured, and any resulting trial would involve many common issues of law and fact).
The court further considered that the original defendants had removed before separate suits could

be consolidated, the patient moved to join the new defendants only six days after removal and
moved to remand the case only four days after that, remand of the case at this early stage would
not prejudice defendants, upon remand the case could be consolidated with related state court
litigation, and the patient’s motive in adding non-diverse defendants post-removal was not
primarily to circumvent federal jurisdiction, but rather to avoid multiple litigation.
Fifth Circuit
Anzures v. Prologis Texas I LLC, 886 F.Supp.2d 555 (W.D.Tex. 2012) (in a removed
case, denying plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend to add a non-diverse party whose inclusion
would destroy diversity jurisdiction, noting that such a motion is governed by 28 U.S.C.A. §
1447(e), rather than by the federal Civil rule governing motions for leave to amend; reasoning
that the district court should consider: (1) whether the primary purpose of the amendment is to
defeat diversity jurisdiction, (2) whether the plaintiff was diligent in seeking to amend, (3)
whether the plaintiff would be prejudiced if the amendment were denied, and (4) any other
factors bearing on the equities; and concluding that, in this case, the primary purpose of the
proposed amendment to the complaint to join plaintiff’s employer in a negligence action arising
out of a construction worker’s fall through a roof skylight was to defeat diversity jurisdiction,
that the plaintiff employee knew of the facts allegedly supporting a claim against the employer
well before discovery commenced and before the existing defendant building owner sought leave
to designate the employer a responsible third party, that the eight-month delay in moving to
amend constituted lack of diligence by plaintiff, and that plaintiff would not be prejudiced by
denial of his motion to amend, where plaintiff already was pursuing claims against his employer
in state court and therefore still would be able to obtain complete relief).
Wuellner Oil & Gas, Inc v. EnCana Oil & Gas (USA) Inc., 861 F.Supp.2d 775 (W.D.La.
2012) (denying post-removal motion for leave to file a supplemental and amended petition to
join a non-diverse defendant, holding that – although the court had no direct evidence that
plaintiffs’ purpose was to destroy diversity jurisdiction and the motion was filed within the
deadline to join parties – plaintiffs were not entitled to post-removal joinder of a non-diverse
defendant in a breach of contract action, absent any colorable claims against that party, as
plaintiffs would not be significantly injured by remaining in federal court).
Seventh Circuit
McIntosh v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 891 F.Supp.2d 985 (N.D.Ill. 2012) (permitting
post-removal joinder of a non-diverse defendant and remanding to state court, reasoning in part
that, to permit joinder of a non-diverse party after removal, it is not necessary that the nondiverse party be indispensable to just adjudication of the lawsuit and further that the non-diverse
property manager was not fraudulently joined in a tenant’s action against her landlord for
allegedly failing to maintain heat or hot water at the premises, as there was a reasonable
possibility that the tenant could recover from the property manager for negligence under Illinois
law; in permitting the amendment to the complaint, the court took into account that the tenant
promptly requested permission to amend the complaint to join the manager after discovering the
manager’s role in maintaining the building, that the tenant would be prejudiced by a denial of

joinder of the manager because it could result in inconsistent results by requiring a separate state
court proceeding against the manager, and that the landlord would not be prejudiced by
proceeding in Illinois state court).
Eleventh Circuit
Small v. Ford Motor Co., 923 F.Supp.2d 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (denying leave to file an
amended complaint and a motion to remand to state court, holding it inappropriate to grant, to the
guardian of a passenger who was ejected from a vehicle in a rollover car accident, leave to amend
her products liability complaint against a vehicle manufacturer and the manufacturer of the
vehicle’s seatbelt system to add a non-diverse party, the company that allegedly sold the car;
reasoning that the timing and substance of the proposed amendment strongly suggested
motivation to destroy diversity jurisdiction where the accident occurred much earlier, and no
discovery had prompted the proposed amendment; moreover, the guardian would not be
significantly prejudiced by disallowance of the amendment as it had sued a fully solvent
defendant, and the balance of equities weighed against allowing the amendment as is seemed
unlikely that plaintiff actually would pursue a state law claim against the car seller).
Propriety of Realignment before Diversity Jurisdiction is Decided
Porter v. Crumpton & Associates, LLC, 862 F.Supp.2d 1303 (M.D.Ala. 2012) (denying
remand to state court, holding in part that the court would realign a judgment debtor as a plaintiff
in a judgment creditors’ action against a debtor and its professional liability insurer, seeking
insurance proceeds to satisfy their $250,000 judgment, where the judgment creditors’ interests
aligned directly with those of the debtor, because they both wanted the insurer to pay the
judgment that the creditors had obtained against the debtor, and realignment would not result in a
direct action against the insurer; as a result, the court had diversity jurisdiction over the removed
action).
The Treatment of Nominal parties
Dooley v. Hartford Acc. and Indem. Co., 892 F.Supp.2d 762 (W.D.Va. 2012) (denying
remand to state court, holding that although the insured and the driver of the other vehicle
involved in an accident both were “residents” of Virginia, the other driver’s citizenship was
irrelevant for purposes of determining diversity of citizenship and the propriety of the removal of
the insured’s action against his insurer, seeking a declaration that his auto insurance policy
afforded him $200,000 in under-insured motorist coverage in connection with the accident,
where the insured did not assert any claim against the other driver or request relief from him).
Determining Whether Non-Diverse Parties were Fraudulently (or Improperly) Joined
Fourth Circuit
Heller v. TriEnergy, Inc., 877 F.Supp.2d 414 (N.D.W.Va. 2012) (denying remand to state
court and granting a motion to compel arbitration, holding in part that a notary public was

fraudulently joined in a property owners’ removed action against an energy company and the
assignees of the company’s rights pursuant to an oil and gas lease agreement with the property
owners, and thus the notary’s citizenship would be disregarded for diversity jurisdiction
purposes, despite the owners’ contention that the notary breached his duties under a West
Virginia statute by acknowledging the owners’ signature on a lease without having witnessed the
signing, where the owners had no possible claim against the notary under West Virginia law, for
damages proximately caused by the notary’s misconduct, as the owners admitted that they signed
the lease).
McCoy v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 858 F.Supp.2d 639 (S.D.W.Va. 2012) (denying
remand to state court, holding in part that a landowner had no possibility of recovery in a state
court against a non-diverse railroad employee, and thus the employee was fraudulently joined as
a defendant in the landowner’s removed action against a railroad, seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief with respect to an alleged easement-by-implication and easement-by-necessity,
and asserting claims for breach of contract and negligence, where the non-diverse employee had
not been party to the alleged agreement transferring ownership of disputed property from the
railroad to the landowner, the employee had no interest in the disputed property, and the
employee owed no duty to the landowner).
Fifth Circuit
Benavides v. EMC Mortgage Corp., 916 F.Supp.2d 776 (S.D.Tex. 2013) (upholding
removal of case and dismissing for failure to state a claim against an in-state law firm, where the
firm’s threatened foreclosure on the mortgagors’ home did not constitute “threatening to take an
action prohibited by law,” within the meaning of the Texas Debt Collection Act (TDCA), and
thus there was no reasonable basis to predict that the mortgagors could prevail on their TDCA
claim against the law firm; further, in-state foreclosure counsel’s alleged failure to provide the
payoff amount to the mortgagors did not constitute “misrepresenting the character, extent or
amount of consumer debt” within the meaning of the TDCA’s prohibition on misrepresentations
in an attempt to collect a debt, and thus, there was no reasonable basis to predict that the
mortgagors could prevail on their TDCA claim against counsel where the mortgagors did not
allege that counsel made any false or misleading representations; in-state foreclosure counsel had
no claim in its own right to the mortgagors’ home, and the mortgagors did not allege that their
own title was superior, as required to state a claim against counsel in a suit to quiet title; the law
firm was improperly joined in an action challenging foreclosure).
Johnson v. Rimes, 890 F.Supp.2d 743 (S.D.Miss. 2012) (denying remand to state court by
virtue of the fraudulent joinder of a non-diverse insurance adjuster). Under Mississippi law, an
insurance adjuster may be held independently liable for its work on a claim only if its acts
amount to gross negligence or certain other types of conduct. That defendant insurance adjusters
failure to seek a medical authorization from the insured and to have her undergo a medical
examination under oath, to determine the nature and extent of her injuries following an accident,
did not amount to gross negligence and, thus, the adjusters could not be held liable for the auto
insurer’s allegedly wrongful denial of plaintiff’s uninsured motorist claim.

Moreno Energy, Inc. v. Marathon Oil Co., 884 F.Supp.2d 577 (S.D.Tex. 2012) (denying
remand to state court of action alleging that oil company and its affiliates deprived plaintiff of
substantial royalties from overseas property, applying principles that a contention of fraudulent
joinder in a removed action must be pleaded with particularity and supported by clear and
convincing evidence and that an improperly joined, non-diverse defendant can remove a case by
arguing improper joinder, and ordering Marathon to file an amended removal notice and to
provide evidence of two co-defendants’ citizenships, to both allege and establish that they were
formed under the laws of the Cayman Islands).
Keen v. Wausau Business Ins. Co., 875 F.Supp.2d 682 (S.D.Tex. 2012) (denying remand
to state court, holding that the plaintiff worker made no specific and individualized factual
allegations against his workers’ compensation insurer’s adjuster, as required to give rise to
individual liability, and thus the adjuster was improperly joined in this removed action also
against the insurer for alleged mishandling of the workers’ compensation claim, where the
worker alleged only generally that both the insurer and the adjuster failed to conduct a reasonable
investigation of his claim; further reasoning that when an adjuster’s actions can be accomplished
by the insurer through an agent, and when the claims against the adjuster are identical to those
against the insurer, the adjuster’s actions are indistinguishable from the insurer’s and hence are
insufficient to support a claim against the adjuster).
Henry v. O’ Charleys Inc., 861 F.Supp.2d 767 (W.D.La. 2012) (denying remand to state
court, holding in part that a non-diverse restaurant manager, on duty on the date of a patron’s
alleged slip and fall accident, was improperly joined to defeat diversity jurisdiction in the
restaurant patron’s removed action to recover damages for injuries she allegedly sustained when
she slipped and fell at the restaurant, where the patron could not maintain a claim under
Louisiana law against the manager for breaching any duty to supervise and/or train restaurant
employees to exercise reasonable care, because he neither caused the spill that led to her
accident, nor had personal knowledge of the spill; under these circumstances, the manager had no
personal duty to the plaintiff, the breach of which specifically caused plaintiff’s damages;
similarly, a non-diverse Louisiana corporation was improperly joined, as the patron could not
maintain a claim under Louisiana law against the corporation, which did not own or operate the
restaurant).
Sixth Circuit
Lyons v. Trott & Trott, 905 F.Supp.2d 768 (E.D.Mich. 2012) (upholding removal, over a
Michigan borrower’s lawsuit, alleging wrongful foreclosure and seeking to enjoin a sheriff’s sale
of the borrower’s foreclosed home, holding that the borrower had no colorable claim against a
Michigan law firm that represented the North Carolina lender and loan servicer, as local counsel,
and thus removing defendants established fraudulent joinder of the law firm, warranting denial of
plaintiff’s motion to remand for lack of complete diversity). The law firm was merely an agent of
the diverse defendants, from whom the borrower could obtain no direct relief, and since the firm
was not a foreclosing party under Michigan law, its citizenship was properly disregarded for
purposes of determining diversity jurisdiction.

Seventh Circuit
Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg, Sales Practices & Prod. Liab Litig., 870 F.Supp.2d
587 (S.D.Ill. 2012) (denying remand to state court, holding in part that the pharmacy that sold
prescription drugs that allegedly caused a consumer’s injuries was fraudulently joined in this
removed action, as the consumer had no reasonable chance of succeeding against the pharmacy
on a breach of express warranty claim since she failed to allege any representation made by the
pharmacy that would serve as a basis for that claim, and the consumer also could not succeed on
a failure to warn or Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine claim against the
pharmacy, which was protected by the learned-intermediary doctrine and because plaintiff failed
to allege any action by the pharmacy that contributed to the harm alleged).
Eighth Circuit
Wages v. Johnson Regional Med. Ctr., 916 F.Supp.2d 900 (W.D.Ark. 2013) (denying
remand to state court, holding that hospital, a citizen of Arkansas, was fraudulently joined to
defeat removal of Arkansas patient’s action asserting claims arising out of surgical implantation
of a mesh medical device into plaintiff patient, where the patient’s claims against the hospital
flowed entirely from “medical injury” within the meaning of the Arkansas Medical Malpractice
Act, for which the two-year statute of limitations had run, so there was no reasonable basis for
predicting that Arkansas law might impose liability on the hospital).
Shepherd v. Baptist Health, 916 F.Supp.2d 891 (E.D.Ark. 2012) (denying remand,
holding that a medical center was fraudulently joined in a removed product liability action based
on an alleged defect in a pelvic mesh medical device implanted in plaintiff patient, where – in
light of the applicable statute of limitations – there was no reasonable basis for predicting that
Arkansas law might impose liability on the medical center).
Brinkman v. Bank of America, N.A., 914 F.Supp.2d 984 (D. Minn. 2012) (denying
remand to state court, holding in part that homeowners fraudulently joined a law firm that
represented defendant mortgage loan servicers and that, like the homeowners, was a citizen of
Minnesota, in a removed suit against the firm and that loan servicers to challenge the validity of
home mortgages in an effort to prevent foreclosures; thus, the district court could disregard the
firm and its citizenship and exercise diversity jurisdiction over the remaining claims). The court
reasoned that, under Minnesota law, the homeowners had no colorable cause of action against the
firm, for reasons detailed in the opinion.
Gurley v. FedEx Ground Package Systems, Inc., 874 F.Supp.2d 803 (S.D.Iowa 2012)
(denying remand to state court, holding that non-diverse co-workers were fraudulently joined to
defeat removal based on diversity in a former employee’s action claiming discrimination by his
employer and coworkers, in violation of the Iowa Civil Rights Act, since the claims against the
co-workers were time-barred and such claims provided no reasonable basis for predicting
liability of the co-workers).

Karnatcheva v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 871 F.Supp.2d 834 (D. Minn. 2012)
(upholding removal and dismissing suit, holding that a non-diverse law firm which represented
parties seeking to foreclose on homes was fraudulently joined as a defendant in mortgagors’
action challenging those proceedings where the mortgagors failed to assert a “colorable” claim
under state law against the firm, and thus removal of the mortgagors’ action to federal court was
appropriate). Under Minnesota law, a law firm that represented parties seeking to foreclose on
homes was immune from liability for actions it took with respect to foreclosure proceedings.
Ninth Circuit
Villains, Inc. v. Am Econ. Ins. Co., 870 F.Supp.2d 792 (N.D.Cal. 2012) (denying remand
to state court, reasoning that an accounting company and certified public accountant (CPA), hired
by insurers to determine insureds’ loss from fire that damaged insured property and interrupted
insureds’ businesses, were fraudulently joined in insureds’ removed action claiming that the
insurers breached their contract and that the accounting company and CPA aided and abetted the
insurers, in violation of California law, because the aiding and abetting claim was not viable
under the “agency immunity rule,” as the company and CPA were the insurers’ agents, and the
insureds’ allegations did not implicate the exception to the immunity rule for agent conduct
undertaken in pursuit of personal interest and not solely on behalf of the principal, as the
accountants’ financial advantage derived entirely from the agency relationship).
Eleventh Circuit
De Varona v. Discount Auto Parts, LLC, 860 F.Supp.2d 1344 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (denying
remand to state court, holding in part that unauthenticated pictures of a parking lot did not
establish that a store manager breached any duty under Florida law to a patron, as required for the
patron to have a reasonable basis for negligence claims against the manager based on a slip and
fall on a foreign substance in the parking lot, and therefore, the manager was fraudulently joined
in this removed action; the pictures were not dated, it was not apparent that they were taken at the
store where the incident occurred, and they did not show the location of the manager’s office in
relation to the substance, to establish the manager’s knowledge).
Remand where Complete Diversity is Lacking
Second Circuit
BGC Partners, Inc. v. Avison Young (Canada), Inc., 919 F.Supp.2d 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(remanding to state court, holding in part that a Canadian brokerage and its affiliates failed to
establish that recovery against a New York affiliate was precluded; therefore, complete diversity
did not exist in a New York brokerage’s action against the Canadian brokerage and its affiliates,
alleging various claims).
Third Circuit
In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine, Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine) Products Liability
Litigation, 905 F.Supp.2d 644 (E.D.Pa. 2012) (remanding to state court for lack of diversity

jurisdiction, holding that a diet drug distributor, a non-diverse defendant in plaintiff diet drug
users’ action against a distributor and diet drug manufacturer, alleging strict products liability,
negligence, breach of warranty, deceit by concealment, and violations of consumer protection
statutes, was not fraudulently joined to defeat removal, where the users pleaded colorable state
law claims against the distributor; it did not matter that distributor contended that the claims were
preempted by federal law).
Fifth Circuit
Coffman v. Dole Fresh Fruit Co., 927 F.Supp.2d 427 (E.D.Tex. 2013) (ordering remand
to state court, holding in part that a Texas plaintiff’s incorrect pleading of a Texas firm as a codefendant in its negligence action was not “fraudulent joinder” where the plaintiff was merely
mistaken as to which one of a defendant’s subsidiaries was the proper co-defendant in this action,
and did not attempt to conceal the citizenship of the Texas co-defendant; actual fraud in the
allegation of jurisdictional facts of a kind that will defeat a plaintiff’s motion to remand requires
more than a mistake in the pleadings). Thus, the absence of consent to removal, from the nondiverse party, rendered the removal procedurally defective.
Andrews v. AMERCO, 920 F.Supp.2d 696 (E.D.La. 2013) (remanding to state court,
holding – in a personal injury action against the lessor of trailers, its agents, and its subsidiaries -that a non-diverse subsidiary had not been fraudulently or improperly joined where it was facially
plausible that the defendant could have liability with respect to the leased trailer that had
allegedly caused an accident that resulted in the plaintiff motorists’ injuries; thus, the district
court was precluded from exercising diversity jurisdiction over the removed action since
complete diversity did not exist).
J.O.B Investments, LLC v. Gootee Services, LLC, 908 F.Supp.2d 771 (E.D.La. 2012)
(remanding to state court, holding that the owner of apartment complex did not egregiously misjoin non-diverse contractors as defendants under Louisiana joinder law, and thus the federal
district court lacked diversity jurisdiction over a removed action against the contractors that
allegedly performed faulty work on the complex’s air conditioning system and against property
insurers that allegedly failed to timely pay insurance claims, in bad faith; the factual overlap in
the claims rendered the joinder proper, where the owner alleged that damage to the air
conditioning was caused by the contractors’ negligence, and the insurers contended the damage
was due to corrosion that was excluded from policy coverage).
Fairley v. ESPN, Inc., 879 F.Supp.2d 552 (S.D.Miss. 2012) (remanding to state court,
holding that defendants in a removed Mississippi defamation action failed to establish that the
resident defendant, the source of some of the alleged defamatory statements, was improperly
joined in this action by plaintiff, a citizen of Mississippi, where Mississippi law was uncertain as
to whether, or under what specific circumstances, a source of an alleged defamation might be
liable for rebroadcast of his statements, and thus as to whether such a rebroadcast commences the
statute of limitations anew; as a result, the court would not conclude that plaintiff had no
reasonable possibility of establishing that his claim against the resident defendant was timelyfiled).

Conner v. Kraemer-Shows Oilfield Servs., LLC, 876 F.Supp.2d 750 (W.D.La. 2012)
(remanding to state court, holding that a Louisiana employer was not improperly joined in a
Louisiana employee’s state court personal injury lawsuit where the employee sufficiently alleged
an intentional tort claim against the employer under an exception to the Louisiana Workers’
Compensation Act that prohibited an employee from suing his employer for tort damages and
limited the employee to workers’ compensation for work-related injuries unless the employee’s
injury resulted from his employer’s intentional act; defendant did not carry its heavy burden of
demonstrating improper joinder).
Sixth Circuit
CPC Livestock, LLC v. Fifth Third Bank, Inc., 495 B.R. 332 (W.D. Ky. 2013) (rejecting
federal question jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction, upholding “related to” bankruptcy
jurisdiction over a removed action, but nonetheless remanding to state court under both
mandatory and permissive abstention doctrines). The court held that under Kentucky law, a
two-year limitations period arguably applied to make timely a claim asserted against the principal
of a livestock brokerage company which arguably sought damages for injury to personal property
under a statute codifying negligence per se, and therefore the removing defendants failed to
establish that the principal was fraudulently joined to defeat diversity jurisdiction).
Baker v. Residential Funding Co., LLC, 886 F.Supp.2d 591 (E.D.Mich. 2012)
(remanding a removed case to state court, holding that borrowers stated a colorable cause of
action against a non-diverse law firm that represented the assignee of their mortgage in
foreclosure proceedings, and, thus, the non-diverse law firm was not fraudulently joined in
borrowers’ removed action seeking to prevent eviction following a foreclosure sale, reasoning
that although the law firm’s responsibility to conduct a reasonable investigation prior to bringing
suit did not give rise to any duty of care owed to the borrowers – and, under Michigan law, an
opposing party cannot pursue a claim against foreclosure counsel under a negligence theory
based on an alleged injury suffered as a result of foreclosure proceedings --, the law firm
allegedly violated the Michigan Collection Practices Act, which prohibited regulated persons
from making misleading statements in communications to collect a debt).
Ninth Circuit
Hernandez v. Ignite Restaurant Group, Inc., 917 F.Supp.2d 1086 (E.D. Cal. 2013)
(remanding to state court, holding that defendant supervisor was not a sham defendant,
fraudulently joined to defeat diversity jurisdiction in an employee’s removed action against her
employer and supervisor, where the employee asserted viable claims against the supervisor for
defamation and invasion of privacy in violation of state law; as it was not clear that the
manager’s privilege under California law applied outside of claims for intentional interference
with contract, and even if applicable, whether the privilege was absolute or conditional; thus,
court lacked diversity jurisdiction).
IDS Property Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gambrell, 913 F.Supp.2d 748 (D.Ariz. 2012) (remanding to
state court, holding that Arizona law was unclear with respect to whether an in-house claim

adjuster for an insurer could be held liable for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing,
and thus the adjuster was not fraudulently joined by the plaintiff insured; the consequent lack of
diversity jurisdiction warranted remand to state court).
Huber v. Tower Group, Inc., 881 F.Supp.2d 1195 (E.D.Cal. 2012) (remanding to state
court, holding that joinder of a non-diverse insurance adjuster as a defendant in a lawsuit brought
by insureds, under their homeowners’ policy, against their insurer, was not fraudulent since
insureds stated a viable negligence claim against the adjuster where they alleged not only that
they should have received a higher monetary payout under their policy, following damage
suffered during severe weather, but also that the adjuster’s authorization and oversight of
emergency repairs resulted in damage to the property; thus, complete diversity was lacking and
remand was required). The court imposed on the removing party the burden to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that joinder was fraudulent, and stated that, if there is a non-fanciful
possibility that the plaintiffs can state a claim against the non-diverse defendant, the district court
must remand.
Tenth Circuit
Von Dowmun v. Synthes, 908 F.Supp.2d 1179 (N.D.Okla. 2012) (remanding to state
court for lack of diversity jurisdiction, holding that although patient’s strict liability claim against
a non-diverse hospital, for the hospital’s distribution of an allegedly defective medical device
that was surgically implanted in plaintiff at the hospital, was not cognizable under Oklahoma
law, where the hospital was primarily in the business of rendering health care services, and was
not part of the device manufacturer’s marketing chain, defendants failed to show that the hospital
was fraudulently joined so as to allow removal of the action, where it was possible that the
patient could allege facts sufficient to state a plausible negligence claim against the hospital).
Preference for Challenge of Alleged Mis-joinders in State Court
In re Darvocet, Darvon and Propoxyphene Products Liability Litigation, 889 F.Supp.2d
931 (E.D.Ky. 2012) (remanding to state court, refusing to sever consumers' products liability
claims against pharmaceutical companies from their product liability claims against a distributor,
where severing and remanding half of the consumers' claims would not promote efficiency, and
there was nothing improper in the joinder of parties).
Misjoinder of plaintiffs
Fenner v. Wyeth, 912 F.Supp.2d 795 (E.D.Mo. 2012) (reconsidering orders, issued by the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, denying remand to state courts of consumers’ action
against multiple hormone replacement therapy (HRT) drug manufacturers and retailers, and
remanding to state court, holding that a previous order involuntarily dismissing non-diverse
plaintiffs did not cure the lack of complete diversity at the time the case was filed, as an
involuntary dismissal of a non-diverse party cannot render a previously unremovable case
removable, and that the consumers’ alleged misjoinder of claims against manufacturers of HRT

drugs was not so egregious as to constitute fraudulent misjoinder; thus remand to state court was
warranted).
Compare
Reeves v. Prizer, In., 880 F.Supp.2d 926 (S.D.Ill. 2012) (granting motion to remand
removed suit to state court, holding in part that fraudulent misjoinder of plaintiffs was not a valid
basis of federal diversity jurisdiction).
With respect to removals based on diversity jurisdiction, see generally:
Deskins, Sara, and Kathryn Isted, A Waivable Defect? Current Application of the Forum
Defendant Rule, FOR THE DEFENSE, Nov. 2012, at 50.
Gray, John Merrill III, Motions – Refining the Standard in Motions Alleging Fraudulent Joinder
(Walker v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 443 F. App'x 946, 2011), 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 225
(2012).
Miller, Article III and Removal Jurisdiction: The Demise of the Complete Diversity Rule and a
Proposed Return to Minimal Diversity, 64 OKLA. L. REV. 269 (2012).
Student article (Pratt, Kevin L.), Twombly, Iqbal, and the Rise of Fraudulent Joinder Litigation,
6 CHARLESTON L. REV. 729 (2012).
Note (Lennon, Nathan A.), Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: Congress has Codified the
Tedford Exception, But Will Inconsistent Applications of "Bad Faith" Swallow the Rule?
(Tedford v. Warner-Lambert Co., 327 F.3d 423, 2003), 40 N. KY. L. REV. 233 (2013).
IV. Removal Based on the Class Action Fairness Act
Burden of Proof
Berniard v. Dow Chem. Co., 481 Fed.Appx. 859 (5th Cir. 2010) (affirming remand to
state court, holding that chemical manufacturers’ speculations were insufficient to plausibly
establish the likely number of persons affected by manufacturers’ sudden release of a potentially
noxious chemical or the severity of harm to those affected, as required to satisfy consolidated
class actions’ amount-in-controversy requirements for jurisdiction under CAFA; the likelihood of
class members’ recovery equaling or exceeding $5 million was not facially apparent from
plaintiffs’ pleadings, given the nature, timing, and geographical extent of the release, the number
of affected people, and the nature of damage allegedly caused by an isolated, quickly controlled,
and geographically limited release).
Bonnel v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 881 F.Supp.2d 1164 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (remanding to
state court an action purportedly removed pursuant to CAFA, reasoning in part that where
plaintiff employee specifically alleged damages in am amount less than $5,000,000, absent proof

of bad faith by plaintiff, the defendant employer had the burden to prove, by a legal certainty, that
the actual amount of damages in controversy would exceed CAFA’s $5,000,000 threshold, in this
putative class action alleging violations of California labor laws; holding that the employer failed
to prove by a legal certainty that the actual amount in controversy exceeded $5,000,000, where
the district court was left to speculate as to whether class members qualified for penalty wages,
and as to the amount of unpaid wages that the employer owed). The court stated that the legal
certainty standard for removal under CAFA at the very least requires defendant to provide
enough concrete evidence to estimate that the actual amount in controversy is over $5,000,000.
The District Court took judicial notice of documents from a previous class action against the
employer, insofar as they related to the employer’s contention of bad faith and to its estimate of
the amount in controversy, where they came from sources whose accuracy could not reasonably
be questioned, as they were filed in the Eastern District of California and were a matter of public
record, but the documents did not show the amount in controversy to a legal certainty because the
complaint in the previous action was based on a different and longer time period. Moreover, even
if plaintiff employee here excluded certain allegations that had been included in the complaint in
the previous class action in order to avoid federal jurisdiction, such a pleading was not itself bad
faith, as would relieve the employer of the burden of proving, by a legal certainty, that CAFA’s
amount-in-controversy requirement was satisfied, where the complaint in the previous action also
did not allege a particular amount of damages, and it asserted more claims than did this plaintiff
employee and claims that related to a longer time period.
Valdez v. Metropolitan Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 867 F.Supp.2d 1143 (D.N.M. 2012)
(denying remand to state court, holding in part that, although insureds did not seek any monetary
damages, there was a monetary benefit to them and a corresponding monetary detriment to
automobile insurers from the equitable relief that insureds sought; defendants proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that the amount-in-controversy requirement of CAFA was
satisfied in a removed class action alleging that automobile insurers violated the New Mexico
Unfair Trade Practices Act by failing to provide class members with adequate information about
their legal options when buying uninsured motorist (UM) coverage; the injunction and
declaratory judgment that insureds sought would retroactively reform the putative class’
insurance policies to ensure that their UM coverage was equal to the limits of the policy and
would extend their coverage, and insurers would be providing coverage without receiving the
payment to which they ordinarily were entitled and would incur administrative costs of
complying with the requested relief). The court adopted the “either viewpoint” rule in appraising
the amount in controversy, consistently with circuit precedent and CAFA’s legislative history.
Defendant carried its burden and plaintiffs failed to demonstrate to a legal certainty that less than
$5 million was in controversy.
Local controversy exception
Richins v. Hofstra University, 908 F.Supp.2d 358 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (remanding to state
court, noting that when jurisdiction is premised on CAFA, the party seeking remand bears the
burden of proving that a CAFA exception applies, and holding that plaintiff law school alumni
showed, by a preponderance of the evidence, that greater than two-thirds of the members of the
proposed plaintiff class were citizens of New York, as required for mandatory remand under

CAFA, in an action alleging that the defendant law school published misleading and deceptive
information regarding graduate employment rates and salaries; concluding that, although the
address information submitted by the alumni, from the law school’s own databases, probably did
not reflect with perfect accuracy the current domicile and intent to remain in New York of every
class member as of date the lawsuit was filed, the information was highly probative of class
members’ state citizenship).
Bey v. Solarworld Industries Am., Inc., 904 F.Supp.2d 1103 (D.Or. 2012) (remanding to
state court, holding that employee’s putative class action against his employer and related
entities, asserting claims under Oregon law to recover unpaid wages, overtime wages, and
penalty wages was a purely local controversy, and district court therefore was required to decline
jurisdiction pursuant to CAFA’s local controversy and home-state controversy exceptions, where
the alleged injury took place in Oregon at the worksite of the employer, an Oregon corporation,
more than 90% of the plaintiff class was Oregon citizens, the complaint alleged violations of
Oregon law only, and the employer raised issues on which the Oregon appellate courts had not
yet spoken).
Valdez v. Metropolitan Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 867 F.Supp.2d 1143 (D.N.M. 2012)
(denying remand to state court, holding in part that, because New Mexico insureds failed to
establish that a non-diverse insurance agent was a defendant from whom significant relief was
sought and whose alleged conduct formed a significant basis for the claims asserted in insureds'
removed class action alleging that automobile insurers violated the New Mexico Unfair Trade
Practices Act by failing to provide class members with adequate information about their legal
options, when buying uninsured motorist coverage, plaintiffs failed to carry their burden to
establish that the local controversy exception to CAFA applied; the policies that the non-diverse
agent sold were not its own, the agent had no policies that could be retroactively reformed and
provided no coverage that could be increased, the agent appeared to be an "isolated role player"
who acted for only one of the six insurer defendants and who had little control over the content
of the policies actually sold, and thus was not a defendant whose conduct formed a significant
basis for the conduct alleged in the complaint and from whom significant relief was sought).
Mass actions
Compare
Abrahamsen v. ConocoPhillips Co., 503 Fed.Appx. 157 (3rd Cir. 2012) (directing remand
to state court of removed actions brought against an oil company by Norwegian former
employees and contractors, holding that the suits were not “mass actions” under CAFA and that
the district court thus lacked jurisdiction under CAFA, where the suits sought recovery for
injuries that employees and contractors sustained while working on rigs, platforms, and vessels in
the North Sea, but each action included fewer than 100 plaintiffs). The court further held that,
absent intervention by the Norwegian government, the actions did not implicate foreign relations,
so as to give rise to federal question jurisdiction, notwithstanding Norway’s sovereignty over
petroleum-based activities in its territorial waters and on it continental shelf.

Parens Patriae Actions
Hawai’i ex rel. Louie v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 907 F.Supp.2d 1188 (D.Hawai’i 2012)
(denying remand on other grounds, but holding that court did not have jurisdiction under CAFA
of a removed action brought by the state attorney general against financial institutions, seeking
penalties and injunctive relief based on violations of Hawai’i’s unfair or deceptive acts or
practices law, because the parens patriae suit was brought pursuant to the attorney general’s civil
enforcement authority to protect the state’s consumers, asserted only state law claims, and
expressly disclaimed any class action).
Appealability of Remands or Denials of Remand in Cases Purportedly Removed under
CAFA
Fifth Circuit
Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 701 F.3d 796 (5th Cir. 2012) (reviewing
de novo a remand pursuant to CAFA, and reversing the grant of the Attorney General’s motion to
remand, holding in part that the case was a removable “mass action” within CAFA).
With respect to cases removed on the basis of CAFA, see generally:
Lemos, Margaret H., Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State Attorneys
General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486 (2012).
Schaerer, Enrique, A Rose by any Other Name: Why a Parens Patriae Action Can Be a "Mass
Action" under the Class Action Fairness Act, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 39 (2013).
Twenty-Fourth Annual Corporate Law Symposium, The Principles of Aggregate Litigation:
CAFA, PSLRA, and Beyond, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 239 (2011).
Comment (Killian, Ryan S.), An Illusion of Sacrifice: The Incompatibility of Binding Stipulations
in CAFA Cases, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 111 (2012).
Comment (Tamm, Kevin), The Class Action Fairness Act and Colorable Reasons for Separate
Class Actions (Freeman v. Blue Ridge Paper Prods., Inc., 551 F.3d 405, 2008), 81 U. CIN. L.
REV. 313 (2012).
Note (Jaeger, Michael), Should They Star or Should They Go: Can State Attorneys General
Avoid Removal of Parens Patriae Suits to Federal Court under the Class Action Fairness Act?,
46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 327 (2012).
V. Amount in Controversy in Removed Actions
Need for More than $75,000 in Controversy in Diversity Cases

Eleventh Circuit
De Varona v. Discount Auto Parts, LLC, 860 F.Supp.2d 1344 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (denying
remand to state court, holding in part that the defendant store established the requisite amount in
controversy in patron’s negligence action following slip and fall in store parking lot and satisfied
the diversity requirement for removal to federal court, where the store asserted that the patron
lost approximately $67,800 in wages and had accumulated more than $13,000 in medical
expenses and the patron offered no evidence other than conclusory allegations in support of her
assertions that store’s numbers were incorrect).
Punitive damages
Third Circuit
Hamm v. Allstate Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 908 F.Supp.2d 656 (W.D.Pa. 2012)
(upholding removal of action by insured homeowners against the insurer on their homeowner’s
policy, alleging breach of contract and bad faith in connection with the denial of their insurance
claim for damage to their home, because the district court could not say to a legal certainty that
the insureds could not recover more than $75,000 where, although the claimed damages for
breach of contract were for repair costs of only $22,080, plaintiffs could recover punitive
damages on their bad faith claim under Pennsylvania’s insurance statute, and an award of
punitive damages just over two times the claimed compensatory damages would put the amount
in controversy over the jurisdictional threshold).
Eighth Circuit
Hurst v. Nissan North America, Inc., 511 Fed.Appx. 584 (8th Cir. 2013) (remanding to
state court, holding that defendant automobile manufacturer’s removal of case, seven days after
auto owner proposed punitive damages instruction in his state court class action alleging
defective dashboards, was timely where the owner’s state court petitions had sought only
compensatory damages that did not exceed the jurisdictional threshold set by CAFA and plaintiff
had made no motion to amend the petition to add punitive damages, but remanding because,
under Missouri law, punitive damages not sought in a state court class action petition were not
recoverable, despite the proposed jury instructions for punitive damages). The court noted,
however, that if the state court permitted the jury to consider punitive damages, immediate
removal would be timely and almost certainly proper.
Eleventh Circuit
Molex Co., LLC v. Andres, 887 F.Supp.2d 1189 (N.D.Ala. 2012) (denying remand of a
removed action alleging violation of the Alabama Trade Secrets Act and breach of fiduciary duty,
concluding that the removing defendant established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
requirements of diversity jurisdiction were satisfied where evidence of business lost by the
plaintiff as a result of defendant’s alleged misuse of trade secrets, along with evidence of profits
and other benefits defendant may have received, as well as potential exemplary damages and

attorneys’ fees allowed by the Act, supported defendant’s contention that the amount in
controversy exceeded $75,000).
Attorneys’ fees
Ninth Circuit
Reames v. AB Car Rental Services, Inc., 899 F.Supp.2d 1012 (D.Or. 2012) (ordering
remand to state court for lack of the requisite amount in controversy, holding that: attorneys’ fees
anticipated to be incurred after the date of removal, or, at the latest, after the date a party’s
motion for remand is decided, are not properly included in the calculation of the amount in
controversy for purposes of diversity jurisdiction; the defendant former employers made no
showing that the former employee’s reasonably anticipated attorneys’ fees following removal
exceeded the amount required to push the amount in controversy over $75,000 and thus, even if
such unaccrued attorneys’ fees could be counted, remand to Oregon state court was warranted;
the amount of attorneys’ fees already incurred by the former employee plaintiff did not clearly
exceed the amount required to push the amount in controversy over $75,000 in his suit against
his former employers for employment discrimination in violation of state law, where the
employers made no showing regarding the amount of attorneys’ fees that the employee incurred
prior to removal; and the possibility that plaintiff would amend his complaint to increase his
damages prayer did not affect the analysis of whether the amount in controversy exceeded the
jurisdictional threshold). Finally, plaintiff had no obligation to stipulate to a cap on his recovery,
and his refusal to enter such a stipulation had no effect on the amount in controversy.
Eleventh Circuit
Molex Co., LLC v. Andres, 887 F.Supp.2d 1189 (N.D.Ala. 2012) (denying remand of a
removed action alleging violation of the Alabama Trade Secrets Act and breach of fiduciary duty,
concluding that the removing defendant established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
requirements of diversity jurisdiction were satisfied where evidence of business lost by the
plaintiff as a result of defendant’s alleged misuse of trade secrets, along with evidence of profits
and other benefits defendant may have received, as well as potential exemplary damages and
attorneys’ fees allowed by the Act, supported defendant’s contention that the amount in
controversy exceeded $75,000).
Amount in Controversy when the Removal Notice is Filed
Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg, Sales Practices & Prod. Liab Litig., 870 F.Supp.2d
587 (S.D.Ill. 2012) (denying remand to state court, holding in part that consumer’s claims made
clear that she was seeking to recover in excess of the $75,000 required for diversity jurisdiction
in her removed products liability action against a pharmacy for injuries allegedly sustained from
use of prescription drugs she purchased from the pharmacy, where she alleged that she suffered
severe and permanent injuries, diminished enjoyment of life, that her injuries would require lifelong medical treatment, and she was seeking punitive damages).

Based on the State Court Record
Ciecka v. Rosen, 908 F.Supp.2d 545 (D.N.J. 2012) (denying remand to state court,
holding that a state court suit between two personal injury law firms that had successively
represented the same client in the same matter and who disputed the allocation of attorneys’ fees
following settlement of the client’s claims was properly removed on the basis of diversity
jurisdiction, even though plaintiff claimed that it would not accept any fee award exceeding
$75,000, since it was reasonably clear that, in the original complaint, plaintiff claimed damages
that exceeded the jurisdictional minimum, where plaintiff sought one-third of the $295,000 gross
legal fees generated, as well as damages for alleged tortious interference with a contractual
relationship; amendment of the complaint after removal will not destroy federal jurisdiction).
Defendants showed by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeded
$75,000 and plaintiffs failed to show to a legal certainty that they could not recover that much.
Complaint as Generally determinative
Benson v. Unilever U.S., Inc., 884 F.Supp.2d 708 (S.D.Ill. 2012) (remanding to state
court on other grounds, noting that, in determining existence of diversity jurisdiction, the amount
in controversy stated in plaintiff’s complaint controls as long as it is made in good faith, and
holding that damages sought by plaintiff in this removed products liability action against a peanut
butter manufacturer, the manufacturer’s parent, and the retailer to recover for injuries plaintiff
allegedly sustained when he bit into a foreign object in the peanut butter, satisfied the amount in
controversy requirement, even though it was unlikely that plaintiff would recover the $200,000
he sought, where plaintiff's attorney filed an affidavit stating that the “amount claimed in the
complaint is for a sum in excess of $200,000.00 for personal and bodily injury and medical and
dental expenses,” and no legal bar made it impossible for plaintiff to recover that amount).
Cases Considering whether the Requisite Amount was in Controversy
The Legal-Certainty Test
Marchese v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 917 F.Supp.2d 452 (D. Md. 2013) (denying
remand to state court, holding that district court had jurisdiction over removed action alleging
that lender committed mortgage fraud, where complete diversity of citizenship existed,
mortgagor’s request for trebled damages on a $50,000 claim proved to a legal certainty that the
amount in controversy exceeded $75,000, and the mortgagor’s request for a declaration that the
power-of-sale clause in a deed of trust was of no effect placed the value of the mortgage loan in
controversy, further exceeding the jurisdictional minimum).
The Preponderance-of-the-Evidence Test
Fourth Circuit
Bowers v. Bank of Am., N.A., 905 F.Supp.2d 697 (D. Md. 2012) (upholding removal,
concluding that district court had diversity jurisdiction over removed action, brought by

mortgagor against mortgage servicer, which alleged state-law claims arising from servicer’s
failure to process mortgage-modification application, where mortgagor was a citizen of
Maryland, servicer was a citizen of North Carolina, and although the dollar amount of damages
specified by the mortgagor was $51 less than the jurisdictional threshold, the value of the
mortgaged property exceeded the necessary amount in controversy and the mortgagor also sought
an unspecified amount of punitive damages; in these circumstances, defendant needed to prove
only by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeded the
jurisdictional minimum, and it did so).
Heller v. TriEnergy, Inc., 877 F.Supp.2d 414 (N.D.W.Va. 2012) (denying remand to state
court and granting motion to compel arbitration, holding in part that the amount in controversy
exceeded $75,000, as required for diversity jurisdiction, in property owners’ removed action
against an energy company and assignees to the company’s rights pursuant to an oil and gas lease
agreement with owners, alleging breach of covenant, bad faith, fraudulent inducement, fraud,
notary’s breach of statutory duties, trespass, tort of outrage, and civil conspiracy, where the
complaint alleged an inducement consisting of a representation from the company that royalty
payments that owners would receive would compare to those received by a dairy farmer who was
receiving $50,000 in monthly royalties per well, the complaint contained an apparently good faith
claim for punitive damages, and an affidavit attached to the complaint indicated that the owners’
counsel made a settlement demand of over $900,000).
McCoy v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 858 F.Supp.2d 639 (S.D.W.Va. 2012) (denying
remand to state court, reasoning in part that a defendant who removes from state court a case in
which the damages sought are unspecified, must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
the matter in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional amount for diversity jurisdiction, and here,
affidavit of railroad engineer, averring as to costs involved in re-establishing railroad crossing,
installing necessary safety apparatuses, and regularly maintaining crossing and apparatuses,
established requisite amount in controversy in landowner’s action against railroad, seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to alleged easement-by-implication and easementby-necessity).
Fifth Circuit
Needbasedapps, LLC v. Robbins, 926 F.Supp.2d 919 (W.D. Tex. 2013) (denying remand
to state court and granting transfer to a different federal district court, holding that the defendant
customer of a software developer, who alleged breach of contract and tort in a declaratory
judgment action, established by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy
exceeded $75,000 where the customer claimed to have incurred costs of $192,000 as a result of
the software developer’s failure to deliver applications in a timely fashion, and the customer
sought to recover $20,000 that it loaned to the developer to develop those applications). The
court also held that a claim under a California statute that authorized a party who had been
recorded without his consent to sue for the greater of $5,000 per violation or three times the
amount of actual damages sustained by the plaintiff was too speculative to give rise to potential
liability that exceeded $75,000, although the claimant alleged that the parties had conversed at

least 15 times. The court declined to consider a declaration filed after removal, where the basis
for jurisdiction was not ambiguous at the time of removal.
Borill v. Centennial Wireless, Inc., 872 F.Supp.2d 522 (W.D.La. 2012) (denying remand,
holding in part that a cell phone retailer that removed a state-court action in which no monetary
amount of damages was asserted demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the
amount in controversy exceeded the federal jurisdictional minimum in a patron’s action seeking
damages for injuries allegedly sustained when patron tripped and fell while walking across the
showroom floor to view a cell phone display, where the patron alleged that she sustained
“severe” injuries to her face, head and spine, and sought recovery for a multitude of past, present,
and future damages, patron refused to stipulate that the amount in controversy did not exceed the
jurisdictional minimum, failed to allege that her damages were less than the amount required for
federal diversity jurisdiction, and failed to argue, in support of her motion to remand, that the
amount in controversy was less than the federal minimum).
Sixth Circuit
YA Landholdings, LLC v. Sunshine Energy, KY I, LLC, 871 F.Supp.2d 650 (E.D.Ky.
2012) (remanding to state court, holding that sub-tenant failed to show that the amount in
controversy exceeded $75,000 as required for removal of forcible detainer actions brought in
Kentucky courts by lessors of commercial gas stations, alleging that the sub-tenant was in default
of the leases, where the lessor sought only possession of the property and not monetary damages,
there was no basis for evaluating the amount in controversy as the rent due for some arbitrary
time period less than the term of the lease, or as back rent, and the sub-tenant failed to submit any
evidence regarding its costs in leaving the premises or the change in the lessor’s economic
position if it obtained possession of the premises).
Tenth Circuit
Aranda v. Foamex Intern., 884 F.Supp.2d 1186 (D.N.M. 2012) (remanding to state court
on other grounds, holding that in a removed action against a mattress manufacturer, brought by a
temporary employee who was injured when he slipped on hydraulic fluid that had leaked from an
improperly repaired forklift, the manufacturer demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence
that the amount in controversy likely exceeded $75,000, where the employee alleged that he
required medical treatment for both knees and surgery on his right knee, sought actual damages
for loss of earnings, future loss of earning capacity, past and future medical expenses, and
punitive damages). The court looked to post-removal evidence to assist it in ascertaining the
amount in controversy when the case was removed.
Eleventh Circuit
Molex Co., LLC v. Andres, 887 F.Supp.2d 1189 (N.D.Ala. 2012) (denying remand of a
removed action alleging violation of the Alabama Trade Secrets Act and breach of fiduciary duty,
concluding that the removing defendant established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
requirements of diversity jurisdiction were satisfied where evidence of business lost by the
plaintiff as a result of defendant’s alleged misuse of trade secrets, along with evidence of profits

and other benefits defendant may have received, as well as potential exemplary damages and
attorneys’ fees allowed by the Act, supported defendant’s contention that the amount in
controversy exceeded $75,000). By contrast, the court also concluded that the removing
defendant’s allegations that he received in excess of $100,000 while working as a consultant for
plaintiff failed to support his contention that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000, since
those allegations did not relate to the amount of plaintiff’s damages. Similarly, the removing
defendant’s conclusory allegations that plaintiff’s product development costs exceeded $75,000,
and that the value of plaintiff’s claim was the same as the value of the products themselves,
failed to support defendant’s amount in controversy contentions, as those amounts failed to take
into account the commercial context in which defendant’s alleged misappropriation had
occurred. Finally, plaintiff’s refusal to stipulate to the amount in controversy did not constitute
proof that the amount was below the threshold required for diversity jurisdiction.
Griffith v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P., 884 F.Supp.2d 1218 (N.D.Ala. 2012) (remanding
to state court, holding that where plaintiff made an unspecified demand for damages, removing
defendant had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy more
likely than not exceeded the requisite jurisdictional amount, but failed to do so; the plaintiff
customer’s denial of defendant discount department store’s requests for an admission regarding
the amount in controversy did not constitute a statement of fact that could support diversity
jurisdiction over the customer’s negligence action against the store, and the customer’s denial did
not establish that an amount in excess of $75,000 was in dispute).
The Inverted Legal-Certainty Test
Qader v. Citibank, 927 F.Supp.2d 86 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (ordering remand to state court,
holding that a consumer’s allegations of damages in the amount of $600,000 were insufficient to
show that consumer could recover damages in excess of $75,000, as required to establish
diversity jurisdiction in a removed case against a bank, alleging fraud, consumer abuse, deceptive
practices, and other torts, where the consumer did not set forth any plausible facts showing that
the bank caused her damages in any amount). The court said that jurisdiction is lacking if it is
apparent, to a legal certainty, from the face of the pleadings, that the plaintiff cannot recover the
amount claimed.
No Standard Articulated
Northwest Public Communications Council ex rel. Oregon v. Qwest Corp., 877
F.Supp.2d 1004 (D.Or. 2012) (denying remand to state court, holding in part that a removed
action for judicial enforcement of a state public utility commission (PUC)’s orders, invoking the
district court’s statutory authority under state law to penalize non-compliance, was a civil action,
rather than an action in the nature of a criminal proceeding, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction,
and further that the amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction was satisfied
where there were millions of dollars of refunds at stake and up to $50,000 in civil penalties for
each of at least four of the alleged violations of PUC orders; hence suit was removable).
Aggregation of Claims, Supplemental Jurisdiction, and Non-Monetary Relief

When Multiple Plaintiffs Sue
Andrews v. Medical Excess, LLC, 863 F.Supp.2d 1137 (M.D.Ala. 2012) (remanding to
state court, holding that amount-in-controversy requirement was not satisfied in suit by
employees against a health insurer, arising from a theft of data containing the employees’
personal information, and claiming breach of fiduciary duty, negligence and wantonness,
negligent training, monitoring, and supervision, because the amounts in controversy on the
various plaintiffs’ claims could not be aggregated, as necessary to avoid remand to state court, as
employees’ claims were separate and distinct, and employees’ each sought, and stipulated to
seeking, $74,999, though each asserted multiple theories in support of that award, and defendant
could not prove to a legal certainty that the claims exceeded $75,000).
Valuing the Relief Sought
Francis v. Allstate In. Co., 869 F.Supp.2d 663 (D.Md. 2012) (denying remand to state
court, reasoning in part that, in insured’s removed action against insurer, claiming that the latter
had a duty to defend a tort action, the amount-in-controversy requirement in declaratory relief
action was met if either the direct pecuniary value of the right the plaintiff sought to enforce, or
the cost to the defendant of complying with any prospective equitable relief, exceeded the
jurisdictional minimum, and that the court should consider all the evidence in the record and
specify exactly what relief the plaintiff sought; holding that, even if defendant insurer no longer
faced potential indemnity liability because the plaintiff insureds had been granted summary
judgment in the underlying litigation, despite the opposing party in that litigation still having an
opportunity to appeal, the amount-in-controversy requirement was met at the time of removal
because the amount included the attorneys’ fees of the plaintiff insureds in the instant suit,
brought under the Maryland Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, which allowed such an award,
and those fees exceeded $75,000).
Using the Viewpoint of Either Party
B & S Holdings, LLC v. BNSF Ry. Co., 889 F.Supp.2d 1252 (E.D.Wash. 2012) (denying
remand to state court of quiet title action, looking to facts presented in the removal notice and
summary judgment-type evidence relevant to the amount in controversy at the time of removal,
and holding that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000, at least from B & S’s perspective,
in a former landowner’s adverse possession action against a railroad, where a contract for the
former landowner’s sale of its property had a holdback provision of $100,000 so as to provide an
incentive for the former landowner to quiet title for the benefit of its successor in interest).
Looking to the diminution in value that would result from the taking, the court concluded that the
value to BNSF could be even greater.
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act
Janis v. Workhorse Custom Chassis, LLC, 891 F.Supp.2d 970 (N.D.Ill. 2012) (remanding
to state court, holding that the alleged seller of a recreational vehicle (RV) who removed a
purchaser’s action under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty--Federal Trade Commission
Improvement Act failed to meet its burden of showing that the requisite amount was in

controversy in light of the $49,999 limitation the plaintiff imposed on her claim; although the
purchaser’s proposed jury instructions added, as an alternate way to calculate damages, a
revocation-of-acceptance theory under which the damages could have been more than the
$50,000 jurisdictional minimum -- absent a limitation on damages--, it was not clear from the
record that, by seeking damages under the alternate theory of recovery, the purchaser abandoned
her long-standing limitation on damages).
VI. Removal of Cases Against Federal Officers
Who are Federal Officers
Banks v. Harrison, 864 F.Supp.2d 142 (D.D.C. 2012) (granting motion to dismiss action
brought against and removed by federal officer who was sued by employee whom defendant
supervised; claim was not cognizable under the Federal Tort Claims Act).
Exception to the Well-pleaded Complaint Rule
Ruppel v. CBS Corp., 701 F.3d 1176 (7th Cir. 2012) (reversing remand to state court,
noting that a colorable federal defense is what causes cases that are removable under § 1442 to
fall within Article III jurisdiction, § 1442 being an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule).
Broad Construction
Leite v. Crane Co., 868 F.Supp.2d 1020 (D.Hawai’i 2012) (denying remand to state court,
holding that manufacturers and sellers of asbestos who had contracted with the Navy to provide
the product for use at a shipyard set forth a colorable federal defense, as required for removal
under the federal officer removal statute of a Navy machinist’s state law failure-to-warn claim,
noting that the federal officer removal statute is liberally construed to give full effect to the
purposes for which it was enacted).
Need for Acting Under Color of Office/ the Direction of a Federal Officer
Fifth Circuit
Najolia v. Northrop Grumman Ship Systems, Inc., 883 F.Supp.2d 646 (E.D.La. 2012)
(denying remand to state court of a Navy veteran’s action against manufacturers, alleging designdefect and failure-to-warn claims arising out of his alleged contraction of malignant pleural
mesothelioma from asbestos aboard a vessel, holding that manufacturers of marine turbines used
in Navy destroyer vessel acted under the direction of a federal officer in designing and
manufacturing the marine turbines, where the Navy had been intimately involved with the
turbines’ design and manufacture, the Navy had imposed a specific obligation on the
manufacturer to use asbestos in manufacturing the turbines and, without the Navy's approval, the
manufacturers could not affix asbestos warnings to equipment they manufactured for use aboard
naval vessels).
Seventh Circuit

Ruppel v. CBS Corp., 701 F.3d 1176 (7th Cir. 2012) (reversing remand to state court,
holding in part that the defendant government contractor’s relationship with plaintiff, who
allegedly developed mesothelioma due to his exposure to asbestos in products provided by the
government contractor to the United States Navy, derived solely from the contractor’s official
duties in installing asbestos for the Navy, and therefore the gravamen of plaintiff’s complaint
occurred while the contractor acted under color of federal authority, as required for the contractor
to remove the case pursuant to the federal officer removal statute). Similarly, the injury sustained
by plaintiff occurred while the contractor "acted under" a federal officer where the contractor
worked hand-in-hand with the federal government, assisting it in building warships.
Ninth Circuit
Cabalce v. VSE Corp., 922 F.Supp.2d 1113 (D. Hawai’i 2013) (remanding to state court,
holding that state law claims against a government contractor for negligence, wrongful death,
ultrahazardous activity, and premises liability arising from the deaths of workers killed in a fire
and explosion while handling government-seized fireworks in or near a storage facility were not
removable under the federal officer removal statute where there was no “causal nexus” between
plaintiff’s claims and takens taken by the contractor pursuant to a federal officer’s directions as
the contractor was an independent contractor, operating without day-to-day control or
supervision by the government of the means and methods of destruction of the fireworks, and
thus the contractor was not “acting under” a government officer or agency in its behavior that
gave rise to the suit).
Extensive Control by Federal Officer
Najolia v. Northrop Grumman Ship Systems, Inc., 883 F.Supp.2d 646 (E.D.La. 2012)
(denying remand to state court of Navy veteran’s action against manufacturers, alleging designdefect and failure-to-warn claims arising out of his alleged contraction of malignant pleural
mesothelioma from asbestos aboard a vessel, holding that a “causal nexus” existed between the
Navy veteran’s claims and the acts that the manufacturer performed under color of federal office,
and thus removal was warranted under federal officer removal statute, as the design-defect claim
arose directly out of the Navy’s alleged instructions to manufacturers to use asbestos in marine
turbines, and the failure-to-warn claim arose directly out of the Navy’s alleged involvement in
determining what warnings could be placed on products manufactured for use aboard the vessel).
Need for a Colorable Federal Defense
Najolia v. Northrop Grumman Ship Systems, Inc., 883 F.Supp.2d 646 (E.D.La. 2012)
(denying remand to state court of Navy veteran’s action against manufacturers, alleging designdefect and failure-to-warn claims arising out of his alleged contraction of malignant pleural
mesothelioma from asbestos aboard vessel, holding that manufacturers of marine turbines used in
Navy destroyer vessel demonstrated a “colorable federal defense” based on the government
contractor immunity, where the Navy had approved reasonably precise specifications that
required manufacturers to comply with military specifications as to the composition of turbines
for use on vessels, the Navy had exercised discretion in failing to require asbestos-related

warnings on the turbines, and the government had more knowledge than the manufacturers
concerning asbestos hazards, at the time the turbines were designed and manufactured).
Leite v. Crane Co., 868 F.Supp.2d 1020 (D.Hawai’i 2012) (denying remand to state court,
holding that manufacturers and sellers of asbestos who had contracted with the Navy to provide
the product for use at a shipyard set forth a colorable federal defense, as required for removal
under the federal officer removal statute, to a Navy machinist’s state law failure-to-warn claim,
where defendants asserted that they were acting in compliance with precise specifications
imposed by the government which had determined which warnings to provide, when the Navy
was aware of the health hazards caused by asbestos exposure; the government’s exercise of
discretion superceded defendants’ duty to warn under Hawai’i law).
Corporations as “persons”
Najolia v. Northrop Grumman Ship Systems, Inc., 883 F.Supp.2d 646 (E.D.La. 2012)
(denying remand to state court of Navy veteran’s action against manufacturers, alleging designdefect and failure-to-warn claims arising out of his alleged contraction of malignant pleural
mesothelioma from asbestos aboard vessel, holding that manufacturers of marine turbines used in
Navy destroyer vessel were “persons” within the meaning of the federal officer removal statute).
Westfall Act certification
Jackson v. United States, 857 F.Supp.2d 158 (D.D.C. 2012) (dismissing removed case on
grounds that claims were barred and plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies, but
concluding that the Westfall Act certification was conclusive for purposes of removal, though
plaintiff could contest the Attorney General’s scope-of-employment certification for other
purposes; allegations that co-workers’ conduct was unethical, unprofessional and unjustified did
not undermine the scope-of-employment finding).
VII. Proceedings under other Statutes Providing For or Prohibiting Removal
Bankruptcy cases
First Circuit
In re International Home Products Inc., 491 B.R. 607 (Bkrtcy.D.Puerto Rico 2013)
(remanding to state court an action for breach of contract and foreclosure of personal guarantees
of a bankrupt debtor’s obligations, where the court held that the claims did not arise under the
bankruptcy laws and were not related to a Title 11 case because the guarantors had waived their
rights to claim against the bankrupt debtors or compete in any bankruptcy, so that resolution of
the claims would not affect the administration of the bankruptcy estate).
Haber v. Massey, 904 F.Supp.2d 136 (D.Mass. 2012) (remanding to state court a personal
injury action against a truck driver and his employer, removed to federal court on the ground of
relation to a bankruptcy case after defendant driver filed a petition for bankruptcy, holding it
conceivable that the action could have an effect on the bankruptcy proceedings where, even if the

bankruptcy estate successfully established coverage under the driver’s or employer’s insurance,
the estate would be diminished by legal fees expended in the litigation, and the if the employer’s
insurance policy was unavailable or inadequate, plaintiff would seek recovery from any personal
insurance coverage on the drivers’s household vehicle).
Second Circuit
Fried v. Lehman Bros. Real Estate Associates III, L.P., 496 B.R. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(denying motion to dismiss removed action by investors who alleged federal and state law claims
that arose out of failed investments in a real estate investment vehicle, holding that plaintiff’s
post-removal amendment of her complaint to eliminate all federal claims did not require
dismissal because the court retained jurisdiction over the matter as “related to” a bankruptcy
proceeding; that jurisdiction was based on the facts at the time of removal).
Lothian Cassidy, LLC v. Lothian Exploration & Development II, L.P., 487 B.R. 158
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (denying remand to state court, holding that federal “arising in” jurisdiction
existed over a creditors’ removed action against non-debtors, asserting state law claims arising
out of an alleged fraudulent conveyance of a debtors’ assets, where resolution of the dispute
would depend, at least in part, on rights created by the bankruptcy court’s order approving sale of
the debtor’s asset to a non-debtor, the bankruptcy court already had issued a number of rulings
covering much of the subject matter at issue, and certain of the creditors’ claims required the
debtors to be named as defendants). The court also rejected the argument that removal was
improper because it was not unanimous, noting that unanimity is not required for removal under
28 U.S.C. § 1452(a).
Fourth Circuit
Loudin v. J.P. Morgan Trust Co., N.A., 481 B.R. 388 (S.D.W.Va. 2012) (remanding to
state court, holding that mobile home purchasers’ action against a vendor, assignee of loans
originated by the vendor, loan servicer, and loan closer, asserting state-law claims concerning the
purchase and the loan, was related to purchasers’ reopened Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases,
providing basis for removal, where the outcome would affect the purchasers’ rights and liabilities
as debtors because the action was now included in amended bankruptcy schedules as an asset,
and a larger recovery from defendants would increase the size of the purchasers’ bankruptcy
estates; also holding that mobile home purchasers’ claims for unconscionable inducement,
unauthorized practice of law, and fraud, asserted after reopening of the purchasers’ bankruptcy
cases, did not arise under the Bankruptcy Code or arise in a case under the Bankruptcy Code, as
would except the action from mandatory abstention after removal, where the claims, to the extent
they were cognizable, were created by state law; even if mandatory abstention was not required,
district court would exercise its discretion to abstain as claims depended only on state law and
presented no bankruptcy issues, there was no non-bankruptcy basis for jurisdiction in district
court, and the purchasers requested jury trial).
Fifth Circuit

Garner v. BankPlus, 484 B.R. 134 (S.D.Miss. 2012) (granting motion and cross-motion to
compel arbitration and dismissing complaint in a proceeding before the district court based on
bankruptcy jurisdiction, having held that whether the court had jurisdiction to grant the
borrowers’ cross-motion to compel arbitration of foreclosure claims asserted by a lender had to
be made based on the face of the borrowers’ complaint, and did not depend on whether the court
would have jurisdiction over the lender’s underlying causes of action, which had been remanded
to state court).
Sixth Circuit
CPC Livestock, LLC v. Fifth Third Bank, Inc., 495 B.R. 332 (W.D. Ky. 2013) (rejecting
federal question jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction, but upholding “related to” bankruptcy
jurisdiction over a removed action, considering plaintiffs’ first amended complaint, which was
operative at the time of removal, even though the removing defendant filed an amended removal
notice after plaintiff filed a second amended complaint; nonetheless remanding to state court
under both mandatory and permissive abstention doctrines). The action – by cattle producers,
auction markets, and cattle dealers against a stockyard and secured lender and principals for the
debtor-livestock brokerage company, -- alleging a variety of torts, was related to the debtor’s
bankruptcy case, and thus fell within bankruptcy jurisdiction where many plaintiffs had filed
proofs of claim against the bankruptcy estate and those claims would be reduced or extinguished
to the extent that plaintiffs prevailed in the removed action, and plaintiffs’ recovery against the
lender would affect the estate’s liabilities by increasing the lender’s claims for indemnification
and contribution. The action, however, was not a “core proceeding.” Mandatory abstention and
remand to state court was warranted where plaintiffs’ claims were based on state law, the action
was commenced in a proper state court that could timely adjudicate it. Permissive abstention also
was warranted as state-law issues substantially predominated, the case had no bankruptcy issues
and presented unsettled questions of state law, and abstention would not affect efficient estate
administration, among other factors.
Regions Bank v. JP Realty Partners, Ltd., 912 F.Supp.2d 604 (M.D.Tenn. 2012)
(remanding to state court a suit that was removed after a corporate subsidiary filed for
bankruptcy, holding that the debtor subsidiary was not a party to a sub-lessor’s action against the
sub’s parent company, seeking to collect for the debtor’s default on rent, so as to create subjectmatter jurisdiction over the sub-lessor’s claims under bankruptcy law, as plaintiff sought no relief
from the debtor, the sub-lessor had litigated to judgment a separate lawsuit in which the debtor
was a defendant, and before removal the debtor did not respond to the complaints and the parent
company specifically represented to the state trial court that the debtor was not a party to the case
for discovery purposes).
CH Holding Co. v. Miller Parking Co., 903 F.Supp.2d 551 (E.D.Mich. 2012) (upholding
removal, reasoning that judgment creditors’ claims against a transferee of assets from the Chapter
7 debtor and the transferee’s shareholders related to the debtor’s bankruptcy even though the
judgment creditors did not name the debtor or its principal as defendants, where the judgment
creditors sought to recover the same assets that the trustee sought in the bankruptcy action, and
allowing the judgment creditors’ claim to continue would disrupt bankruptcy processes).

In re Lunan, 489 B.R. 711 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Tenn. 2012) (Where Chapter 7 debtor’s husband
commenced a state court action against the trustee and auctioneer, alleging error in liquidating
assets that the husband alleged belonged to the husband and children of the debtor, suit was
removed to the Bankruptcy Court, and husband moved to remand, court denied remand, holding
that the 30–day clock on the Chapter 7 trustee’s removal of a lawsuit did not begin to run until
the trustee was formally served with summons and complaint, even if the trustee knew of the suit
before he was served; removal therefore was timely; the bankruptcy court had at least “related to”
jurisdiction over the removed proceeding as the suit, which sought disgorgement of sales
proceeds, plainly was a proceeding that could have an impact on the bankruptcy estate; as a
proceeding based on actions taken by the trustee and auctioneer in their official capacities, and
which would not have arisen outside bankruptcy, the court had “core” jurisdiction over it; the
state court lawsuit violated the Barton doctrine – pursuant to which leave of bankruptcy court
must be obtained by any party wishing to institute a cause of action in a state forum against a
bankruptcy trustee or his delegees such as court-appointed auctioneers, for acts done in the their
official capacities and within their authority as officers of the court – notwithstanding the
husband’s allegation that the sales orders were obtained by fraud and that the trustee, in carrying
out the sales orders, was acting ultra vires; but removal of the suit to the appointing bankruptcy
court cured the Barton doctrine violation). Further, it was not appropriate for the bankruptcy
court to permissively abstain from hearing the removed state court action, where the state court
suit was commenced in violation of the Barton doctrine, so that the state court from which suit
was removed did not have jurisdiction over it.
Seventh Circuit
In re Advance Iron Works, Inc., 495 B.R. 404 (S.D. Ill. 2013) (remanding to state court,
holding that Chapter 11 debtor that was not a party to a state-court action brought by a customer
against the debtor’s vice president and shareholder lacked standing to avail itself of removal
procedures under the bankruptcy removal statute to remove the state-court action to bankruptcy
court, and consent by the Chapter 11 debtor’s vice president and shareholder to the attempted
removal did not cure the problem). The bankruptcy court further held that it was not the proper
court to decide whether the state-court action was barred by the automatic stay protecting the
debtor, given that remand to state court was required.
Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLLC v. AIG Fed. Savings Bank (In re Laddusire), 494 B.R. 383
(Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2013) (remanding to state court a removed foreclosure action that the debtor
removed after she filed for bankruptcy, holding in part that the action was a non-core proceeding
that was within the bankruptcy court’s “related to” jurisdiction, but that permissive abstention
and remand were warranted because remand of the action would have little effect on efficient
administration of the bankruptcy estate, whereas the bankruptcy court’s retention of the
foreclosure action could delay the bankruptcy proceedings, the bankruptcy court lacked authority
to enter a final judgment in the foreclosure case absent the parties’ consent because the
foreclosure action was a non-core proceeding, the action was purely a matter of state law, and
removal appeared to have been motivated at least in part by a desire to draw-out the foreclosure
proceedings).

In re Laddusire v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 494 B.R. 373 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2013)
(remanding to state court a removed action brought by residence owner against her insurer,
asserting claims under a homeowners’ policy, which action residence owner had removed after
she filed for bankruptcy, holding in part that the action was a non-core proceeding that was
within the bankruptcy court’s “related to” jurisdiction, but that remand was warranted because
there appeared to be procedural defects in the removal, the basis for removal was merely the
debtor’s bankruptcy filing, and the bankruptcy court had determined that permissive abstention
was appropriate for a variety of reasons, elaborated in the opinion).
Reeves v. Prizer, In., 880 F.Supp.2d 926 (S.D.Ill. 2012) (granting motion to remand
removed suit to state court, holding in part that mandatory abstention of plaintiff’s products
liability claim against a pharmaceutical manufacturer, pending resolution of plaintiff’s
bankruptcy case, was warranted where the action could not have been commenced in federal
court but for the bankruptcy, the proceeding asserted a state law claim, and the state court could
timely adjudicate the action).
Compare
BGC Partners, Inc. v. Avison Young (Canada), Inc., 919 F.Supp.2d 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(remanding to state court, holding in part that a New York brokerage’s lawsuit against a
Canadian brokerage and its affiliates, asserting various state law claims including tortious
interference with contractual relationships and poaching of brokers and business opportunities
from a bankrupt brokerage that was purchased by the New York brokerage, did not fall within the
federal court’s jurisdiction by virtue of the Canadian brokerage’s ability to assert a defense that
plaintiff’s claims were preempted by bankruptcy proceedings nor on the basis that plaintiff’s
claims related to bankruptcy proceedings; further holding that, if the suit did fall within “related
to” bankruptcy jurisdiction, the district court was required to abstain for a combination of
reasons).
Cases within Admiralty Jurisdiction
Zerega Ave. Realty Corp. v. Hornbeck Offshore Transp., LLC, 882 F.Supp.2d 496
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (deciding case on merits after removal of action over which the court found it
had admiralty jurisdiction).
Cases under Workers’ Compensation Laws
Petri v. Kestrel Oil & Gas Properties, L.P., 878 F.Supp.2d 744 (S.D.Tex. 2012)
(disposing of claims on the merits after holding that claims arising under the Texas Workers’
Compensation Act may not be removed to federal court, regardless of whether jurisdiction is
based on diversity or federal question, and that the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act provided
the exclusive remedy for claims asserted against an oil rig platform worker’s employer, by
plaintiff, as administrator of the worker’s estate and as guardian of the decedent’s sole heir,
insofar as those claims were brought under theories of negligence, strict and/or joint and several
liability, or inherently hazardous or dangerous activity, and arose from an incident in which the
worker was swept off the platform by heavy seas, and killed).

Cases Alleging Retaliatory Discharge for Seeking Workers’ Compensation
Shaw v. Ring Power Corp., 917 F.Supp.2d 1221 (N.D.Fla. 2013) (subject to the court’s
receipt of a memorandum opposing the court’s planned action, indicating that the court would
sever and remand a non-removable state law workers’ compensation retaliation claim that was
removed along with a claim that plaintiff was fired in violation of the federal Family and Medical
Leave Act, holding that 28 U.S.C.A. § 1445(c) barred the removal of the retaliation claim under
circuit precedent, that the objection to the removal was non-waivable under non-precedential
circuit case law, and that new § 1441(c) made severance and partial remand the proper response).
Carey v. Bank of America, N.A., 904 F.Supp.2d 617 (N.D.Tex. 2012) (remanding to state
court an action alleging age and disability discrimination, harassment, and workers’
compensation retaliation in violation of Texas law, holding that the suit was non-removable
based on diversity of citizenship, as the general removal statute authorized removal of cases as a
whole when they are civil actions within the original jurisdiction of the federal courts but the
worker’s compensation retaliation claim was non-removable under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1445(c) and
was not severable from the other claims; when a claim is not removable, the entire civil action
must be remanded).
Belyea v. Florida, Dept. of Revenue, 859 F.Supp.2d 1272 (N.D.Fla. 2012) (ordering that a
party who objected to remand of the workers’ compensation retaliation claim and retention of the
remainder of the case – a federal ADA claim – had to file a memorandum on jurisdiction, and
that, if no party filed such a memorandum, the workers’ compensation retaliation claim would be
remanded and the remainder of the case retained by the federal court, because removal of the
workers’ compensation retaliation claim was procedurally defective, the objection to its removal
was waivable in most of the country but the law in the Eleventh Circuit might be to the contrary,
and under the revised – but not yet effective § 1441(c) – the court would sever and remand the
non-removable claim).
Section 1445(c)’s Trumping Effect __
But see
Brown v. K-MAC Enterprises, 897 F.Supp.2d 1098 (N.D.Okla. 2012) (post-removal,
severing and remanding to state court plaintiff employee’s workers’ compensation claim and
refusing to reconsider the state court’s order granting the employee’s motion to vacate the order
dismissing her action). The court reasoned that preserving the employer’s right to remove claims
arising under federal law outweighed competing considerations, and thus severed and remanded
to state court the employee’s state law claim alleging retaliation for filing a workers’
compensation claim, but the federal court retained the employee’s federal discrimination claims,
which were within the court’s jurisdiction and her state law claims for termination in violation of
public policy and intentional infliction of emotional distress, which were within the court’s
supplemental jurisdiction.
Cases Arising under the Securities Act

Niitsoo v. Alpha Natural Resources, Inc., 902 F.Supp.2d 797 (S.D.W.Va. 2012)
(remanding to state court, holding that Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA)
prohibited the removal of securities the class actions alleging violations of federal law – here the
Securities Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77a et seq.).
VIII. Removal in Cases Involving Foreign States and StateBOwned Entities
Entities Covered by the Act
Skanga Energy & Marine Ltd. v. Arevenca S.A., 875 F.Supp.2d 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(upholding FSIA jurisdiction after removal of action by Nigerian importer of petroleum products,
against Venezuelan government-owned seller and its alleged agent, seeking an $11 million
refund for product never delivered, and denying forum non conveniens dismissal; finding that the
case fell under the FSIA’s commercial activity exception).
IX. Who May Remove a Case
Plaintiffs Cannot Remove
Cohn v. Charles, 857 F.Supp.2d 544 (D.Md. 2012) (remanding to state court, holding in
part that mortgagor’s counterclaim against the substitute trustees in a state court foreclosure
action and the third-party complaint against the mortgagee did not create a removable civil
action, to which the trustees or mortgagee were “defendants,” within the meaning of the removal
statute, even though the mortgagor claimed that the trustees and mortgagee violated federal TILA
and RESPA, since the counterclaim and third-party complaint were filed within the trustees’ state
court foreclosure action on behalf of the mortgagee that was commenced by a well-pleaded
complaint that did not raise issues of federal law).
Third-party Defendants Generally Cannot Remove
Cohn v. Charles, 857 F.Supp.2d 544 (D.Md. 2012) (remanding to state court, holding in
part that mortgagor’s counterclaim against substitute trustees in state court foreclosure action and
third-party complaint against mortgagee did not create a removable civil action, to which trustees
or mortgagee were “defendants,” within meaning of removal statute, even though mortgagor
claimed that trustees and mortgagee violated federal TILA and RESPA, since counterclaim and
third-party complaint were filed within trustees’ state court foreclosure action on behalf of
mortgagee that was commenced by well-pleaded complaint that did not raise issue of federal
law).
The Need for All Properly Joined and Served Defendants to Consent to Removal
Third Circuit
Cacoilo v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 902 F.Supp.2d 511 (D.N.J. 2012) (remanding to state
court, holding that notice of removal filed by benzene product manufacturers and producers in a
wrongful death action by parents of a Marine who allegedly died due to exposure to benzene

products was procedurally defective where several other defendants who had been properly
served at the time of removal failed to join in, or consent to, the removal; further holding that a
notice of consent to removal filed outside the thirty-day period for removal did nothing to cure
the defect in removal procedure). Finally, it was not in the interests of justice and judicial
economy to allow the benzene product manufacturers and producers an opportunity to cure the
defect in removal procedure, if they could, where the federal court had issued no substantive
orders, and held no scheduling conference.
Fifth Circuit
Coffman v. Dole Fresh Fruit Co., 927 F.Supp.2d 427 (E.D.Tex. 2013) (ordering remand
to state court, holding in part that a co-defendant's filing of an answer to plaintiff’s negligence
complaint and opposing plaintiff’s motion to remand to state court were insufficient to establish
that the co-defendant consented to removal of the action). Opposition to the remand, which was
filed outside the 30-day period for removal, was untimely, in any event.
Tilley v. Tisdale, 914 F.Supp.2d 846 (E.D. Tex. 2012) (remanding to state court, holding
that removal was defective under the rule requiring all properly joined and served defendants to
join in or otherwise timely consent to removal; a co-defendant’s silence did not constitute
consent to removal, and no exceptional circumstances relieved the removing defendants from the
unanimous consent requirement where, instead of alerting the court to their unsuccessful
attempts to obtain consent from the co-defendant, the removing defendants waited until they filed
their response to plaintiff’s motion to remand, well after the thirty-day period for the codefendant to consent, to explain that the co-defendant had been unresponsive to counsel’s
e-mails).
District of Columbia Circuit
Hurt v. District of Columbia, 869 F.Supp.2d 84 (D.D.C 2012) (remanding to state court,
holding that a nightclub’s failure to consent to removal warranted remand of a patron’s action
against the District of Columbia, nightclub, and police officers, alleging assault and battery,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights, where
the District and nightclub both had been served, but the nightclub did not consent or request an
extension of time to file consent to removal; the remand motion was timely filed because the
period for filing the motion to remand was extended by virtue of the ordinary time to file falling
on a weekend and federal holiday; failure by defendants to unanimously consent to removal in a
timely fashion is not a curable defect if the plaintiff makes a timely objection to the removal).
Courts to Ignore Unserved Defendants
Hernandez v. Ignite Restaurant Group, Inc., 917 F.Supp.2d 1086 (E.D. Cal. 2013)
(remanding to state court on other grounds, but holding that defendant supervisor’s consent to
removal was not required in employee’s action against her employer and supervisor, asserting
claims for wrongful termination and employment discrimination, where there was no indication
in the record that the supervisor had been served by the employee prior to removal).

Court to Disregard Nominal parties
Hernandez v. Ferris, 917 F.Supp.2d 1224 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (denying remand to state
court, holding that financial institution defendants were nominal parties whose consent to
removal was not required in an action brought by a guardian of the property for an elderly
account holder against the institutions and a joint owner who allegedly used her relationship of
trust and confidence with the account holder to coerce or unduly influence the account holder to
change ownership of her accounts to reflect joint ownership with rights of survivorship; the
action sought appointment of a legal guardian for the account holder and an ex parte injunction
freezing the accounts held by the defendant institutions; the financial institutions had no legal
interest in the outcome of the dispute, and the complaint was devoid of any allegations of
wrongdoing or liability against the institutions).
Compare
Cacoilo v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 902 F.Supp.2d 511 (D.N.J. 2012) (remanding to state
court, holding that the notice of removal filed by benzene product manufacturers and producers
in a wrongful death action by the parents of a Marine who allegedly died due to exposure to
benzene products was procedurally defective where several other defendants who had been
properly served at the time of removal failed to join in, or consent to, the removal; moreover, the
benzene product manufacturers and producers who removed the action failed to demonstrate that
the other defendants were nominal parties, as required to warrant disregard of those defendants
for purposes of the unanimity requirement for removal, where there was a reasonable basis to
predict that the other defendants could be held liable based on their alleged involvement in the
manufacture of benzene-containing products.
Courts to Disregard Improperly joined parties
Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg, Sales Practices & Prod. Liab Litig., 870 F.Supp.2d
587 (S.D.Ill. 2012) (denying remand to state court, holding in part that because the pharmacy that
sold prescription drugs that allegedly caused a consumer’s injuries was fraudulently joined in this
removed action, its consent to removal was not required).
Henry v. O”Charleys Inc., 861 F.Supp.2d 767 (W.D.La. 2012) (denying remand to state
court, holding in part that the failure of a non-diverse restaurant manager and non-diverse
corporation to join the removal notice did not render the removal procedurally defective where
the court had held that they were improperly joined to defeat diversity jurisdiction; the rule of
unanimity, requiring all properly served defendants to timely join in or consent to removal, does
not apply to improperly joined defendants).
With respect to who may remove, see generally:
Ressler, Jayne S., Removing Removal’s Unanimity Rule, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 1391 (2013).
X. Time to Remove

Measuring from the Initial Pleading
Mendez v. Jarden Corp., 503 Fed.Appx. 930 (11th Cir. 2013) (denying remand, holding
removal timely where defendant in a products liability action did not know that plaintiff was a
citizen of Florida at the time she served the complaint, so as to trigger the 30-day period for
removal; defendant’s knowledge that plaintiff lived in Florida at the time of the accident, years
before the suit was filed, was insufficient to render the case removable upon service of the
complaint).
Froehlich v. CACH, LLC, 289 F.R.D. 454 (S.D.Ohio 2013) (denying remand to state
court, holding removal timely, reasoning that civil Federal Rule making federal civil procedural
rules applicable to an action that has been removed to federal court does not preclude use of the
civil federal procedural rule governing time computation to extend the 30-day time limit for
removing actions from state court, and concluding that the federal time computation rule
extended the 30-day removal deadline to the next business day).
Service upon an Authorized Agent
Aranda v. Foamex Intern., 884 F.Supp.2d 1186 (D.N.M. 2012) (remanding to state court
removed action against mattress manufacturer, brought by temporary employee who was injured
when he slipped on hydraulic fluid that had leaked from an improperly repaired forklift, holding
that 30-day period for manufacturer to file its notice of removal commenced on the date it
received service of process through its registered agent, even though the complaint misstated the
business relationship between the manufacturer and the entity that was named as defendant,
where the manufacturer was named in the caption of the complaint, the agent knew it had been
served with a summons and complaint meant for this manufacturer, and the complaint set forth
allegations that satisfied the amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction, making
the case ascertainably removable).
Determinations of the Timeliness of Removal
Cameron v. Teeberry Logistics, LLC, 920 F.Supp.2d 1309 (N.D.Ga. 2013) (denying
remand to state court, holding that driver’s supplementation of answers to discovery requests by
truck driver and owner, which indicated medical expenses of $62,432.45 and that plaintiff had
been out of work for half a year, did not provide unambiguous notice of removability under
diversity jurisdiction of driver’s action to recover for injuries sustained in an accident with the
truck, where the driver did not state the amount of lost wages she was seeking and her medical
bills did not exceed $75,000, nor did driver’s orthopedic consult statement recommending and
scheduling surgery but not the estimated cost of the surgery or discovery supplementation
indicating medical expenses of $91,413.75 provide unambiguous notice of removability where
the complaint explicitly stated that damages would not exceed $50,000, but driver’s demand
letter, seeking a settlement of $575,000, did provide unambiguous notice of removability under
diversity jurisdiction). Measuring from defendant’s receipt of that letter, removal was filed
within 30 days of the notice of removability, as required by § 1446(b)(3).
Other Papers Triggering Removal Rights

Fifth Circuit
Borill v. Centennial Wireless, Inc., 872 F.Supp.2d 522 (W.D.La. 2012) (denying remand,
holding that thirty-day period for a cell phone retailer to remove a patron’s state-court personal
injury action ran from the date defendant received an “other paper” from which it first could
ascertain that case was removable, rather than from the date of the patron’s initial pleading,
where the initial pleading had not affirmatively revealed that the patron sought damages in excess
of the jurisdictional minimum).
Seventh Circuit
Janis v. Workhorse Custom Chassis, LLC, 891 F.Supp.2d 970 (N.D.Ill. 2012) (remanding
to state court, concluding that proposed jury instructions were an “other paper” for purposes of
the rule extending the time for filing a notice of removal in a matter that initially was not
removable but became removable, and that removable therefore was timely, but holding that the
alleged seller of a recreational vehicle (RV) that removed a purchaser’s action under the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty--Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act failed to meet its
burden of showing that the requisite amount was in controversy in light of the $49,999 limitation
the plaintiff imposed on her claim; although the purchaser’s proposed jury instructions added, as
an alternate way to calculate damages, a revocation-of-acceptance theory under which the
damages could have been more than the $50,000 jurisdictional minimum -- absent a limitation on
damages--, it was not clear from the record that, by seeking damages under the alternate theory of
recovery, the purchaser abandoned her long-standing limitation on damages).
Interrogatory answers
Lambertson v. Go Fit, LLC, 918 F.Supp.2d 1283 (S.D.Fla. 2013) (denying remand to
state court, holding that plaintiff consumer’s response to defendant fitness equipment
manufacturer’s request for admissions in a products liability action served as notice of the
claim’s value so as to trigger the 30-day period for removal of the action to federal court – and
that the removal therefore was timely --, where the initial complaint stated only that the amount
in controversy exceeded $15,000 and the court was unwilling to tie defendant’s time to remove
to a pre-suit demand letter from Lambertson, seeking over $900,000 in damages for serious
permanent physical injuries, including nearly complete blindness in one eye and partial vision
loss in the other eye).
Correspondence
Cameron v. Teeberry Logistics, LLC, 920 F.Supp.2d 1309 (N.D.Ga. 2013) (denying
remand to state court, holding that driver’s supplementation of answers to discovery requests by
truck driver and owner, which indicated medical expenses of $62,432.45 and that plaintiff had
been out of work for half a year, did not provide unambiguous notice of removability under
diversity jurisdiction of the driver’s action to recover for injuries sustained in an accident with
the truck, where the driver did not state the amount of lost wages she was seeking and her
medical bills did not exceed $75,000, nor did driver’s orthopedic consult statement
recommending and scheduling surgery but not the estimated cost of the surgery or discovery

supplementation indicating medical expenses of $91,413.75 provide unambiguous notice of
removability where the complaint explicitly stated that damages would not exceed $50,000, but
driver’s demand letter, seeking a settlement of $575,000, did provide unambiguous notice of
removability under diversity jurisdiction). Measuring from defendant’s receipt of that letter,
removal was filed within 30 days of the notice of removability, as required by § 1446(b)(3).
Ackerberg v. Citicorp USA, Inc., 887 F.Supp.2d 934 (N.D.Cal. 2012) (denying remand to
state court of a credit card holder’s action against the card issuers, holding in part that the
removal was timely where the fact that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000 did not
become apparent until the card holder sent to the issuers a settlement letter, offering to settle the
dispute for $200,000, where defendants filed the removal notice within 30 days of receiving the
settlement letter and the card holder’s complaint did not explicitly state the amount in
controversy).
Rejections of the First-Served-Defendant Rule
Roche v. Morgan Collection, Inc., 882 F.Supp.2d 247 (D.Mass. 2012) (denying remand,
noting that although the thirty-day limit for filing the notice of removal is not jurisdictional, it is
to be strictly applied, but holding that even if the time to remove the plaintiff employee’s action
against her employer and employer’s officers for unpaid wages began to run the day after the
employee mailed copies of the summons and complaint to both the employer and its officers, the
removal was timely, notwithstanding defendants’ contention that they did not “receive” the initial
pleading until the employee had complied with all procedural requirements of New York law).
The court refused to apply what it found to be ministerial requirements of New York law that had
little connection to receipt of the initial pleading as that term is used in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1446. The
court also relied on the principle that the date of service on the last-served defendant triggers the
removal clock.
Cases following 2011 Statutory Amendments
Andrews v. AMERCO, 920 F.Supp.2d 696 (E.D.La. 2013) (remanding to state court,
holding that the thirty-day periods to file notices of removal were triggered by multiple
defendants’ individual service dates, and where services of summons had been completed at
different times, earlier-served defendants could not rely on later-served the defendants’ service
dates to meet the 30-day window, but could consent to removal initiated by later-served
defendants within their own, later, 30-day removal periods). The removal was untimely as each
diverse defendant’s 30-day window to remove had elapsed.
Roche v. Morgan Collection, Inc., 882 F.Supp.2d 247 (D.Mass. 2012) (denying remand,
noting that, although the thirty-day time limit for filing of the notice of removal is not
jurisdictional, it is to be strictly applied, but holding that, even if the time to remove the plaintiff
employee’s action against her employer and employer’s officers for unpaid wages began to run
the day after the employee mailed copies of the summons and complaint to both the employer
and its officers, the removal was timely, notwithstanding defendants’ contention that they did not
“receive” the initial pleading until the employee had complied with all procedural requirements
of New York law). The court refused to apply what it found to be ministerial requirements of

New York law that had little connection to receipt of the initial pleading as that term is used in
28 U.S.C.A. § 1446. The court also relied on the principle that the date of service on the lastserved defendant triggers the removal clock.
The One-Year Limit on Removal of Diversity Cases
Moultrop v. GEICO General Ins. Co., 858 F.Supp.2d 1342 (S.D.Fla. 2012) (remanding
case to state court, holding that insureds’ filing of an amended complaint adding a bad faith claim
– which arguably was the first paper from which defendant could have ascertained that the case
had become removable -- did not operate to commence a new and separate claim so as to avoid
the one-year time limit on removing suits within diversity jurisdiction; thus, removal of the
action was untimely). The court reasoned that the commonly understanding of “commencement
of the action” is when the original complaint is filed that sets in motion the resolution of all
claims, even though an action may come to include new claims and parties. The court also noted
that the 2011 amendment to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1446(c)(1) – permitting avoidance of the one-year
limit if the plaintiff, in bad faith, acted to prevent removal – was inapplicable because this suit
was filed before that amendment became effective.
XI. Venue in Removed Actions
Venue if Filed in Federal Court Immaterial
McPhearson v. Anderson, 874 F.Supp.2d 573 (E.D.Va. 2012) (post-removal, directing
judgment in favor of Anderson, holding that while the court would entertain a post-removal
motion to dismiss for lack of proper venue, the removal statute, rather than the general venue
statute, determined whether venue was proper in federal district court following removal of this
action from Virginia state court suit, and since defendant removed to the district court embracing
the state court where the action was filed, venue was proper).
But see
Marshall v. Allison, 908 F.Supp.2d 186 (D.D.C. 2012) (in removed case, erroneously
concluding that venue was proper, as assessed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391(b)(2)).
Celestial Community Development Corp., Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 901 F.Supp.2d
566 (E.D.Pa. 2012) (in removed case, erroneously concluding that venue was proper by reference
to satisfaction of 28 U.S.CA. § 1391(b)).
Transfer after Removal
Lothian Cassidy, LLC v. Lothian Exploration & Development II, L.P., 487 B.R. 158
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (denying remand to state court and ordering transfer of creditors’ removed
action against non-debtors, asserting state law claims arising out of an alleged fraudulent
conveyance of the debtors’ assets, to the Western District of Texas, reasoning that the transfer
was in the interest of justice and for the convenience of the parties, although the creditors’ choice
of forum was entitled to great weight and transfer would shift inconvenience from the non-

debtors to the creditors, where the transfer would ensure supervision by the court most familiar
with, and with continuing administrative responsibility for, the related bankruptcy proceeding).
Compare—Refusal to Transfer
Molex Co., LLC v. Andres, 887 F.Supp.2d 1189 (N.D.Ala. 2012) (denying remand of a
removed action alleging violation of the Alabama Trade Secrets Act and breach of fiduciary duty
and denying transfer of plaintiff chemical company’s case against its consultant to a federal court
in the state where he resided, where the suit was filed where the plaintiff company was
headquartered, the plaintiff company’s business records were in Alabama, and Alabama law
would apply to the controversy).
XII. Content and Amendment of the Notice of Removal
Failure to File Papers
Ackerberg v. Citicorp USA, Inc., 887 F.Supp.2d 934 (N.D.Cal. 2012) (denying remand to
state court, holding in part that defendants’ failure to provide the federal district court with the
summons, civil case cover sheet, and motion for leave to amend the complaint from plaintiff’s
removed state-court proceedings was a technical defect that did not strip the district court of
jurisdiction and was cured by defendants’ filing of the missing documents, even though the
30–day removal period had expired by the time of that filing).
Amendment of Removal Notice Allowed or Denied
Haber v. Massey, 904 F.Supp.2d 136 (D.Mass. 2012) (remanding to state court a personal
injury action against a truck driver and his employer, removed to federal court on ground of
relation to a bankruptcy case after defendant driver filed a petition for bankruptcy, holding that
defendants were not entitled to amend their notice of removal to add diversity as a ground for
removal both because defendants’ argument that the non-diverse driver should be dismissed from
the action, leaving only diverse parties, was based on contingencies that fell short of a new basis
for jurisdiction and because, after the 30-day period for removal, it was too late for defendants to
add a new basis for jurisdiction).
Kinetic Sys., Inc. v. Federal Financing Bank, 895 F.Supp.2d 983 (N.D.Cal. 2012)
(denying post-removal motion to dismiss but holding that the Federal Financing Bank (FFB) was
required to amend its notice of removal under the federal-agency removal statute – 28 U.S.C.A. §
1442 – in a contractor’s action against the FFB to enforce a bonded stop notice for the
contractor’s work, where the FFB had failed to allege personhood under the federal-agency
removal statute, a causal nexus between its actions and the contractor’s claims, and that it had a
colorable federal defense; noting that the federal-agency removal statute is broadly construed to
favor removal, and further holding that the Bank was not prohibited from amending its notice of
removal even though the 30-day removal period had expired, where the FFB sought only to
clarify the factual underpinnings of its previously asserted basis of jurisdiction, that it was an
agency and instrumentality of the United States Government).

Moreno Energy, Inc. v. Marathon Oil Co., 884 F.Supp.2d 577 (S.D.Tex. 2012) (denying
remand to state court of action alleging that oil company and its affiliates deprived plaintiff of
substantial royalties from overseas property, and holding that leave to amend notice of removal,
rather than remand, was appropriate, where the removing defendant failed to identify the
citizenship of members or partners of defendant unincorporated associations, and failed to
alleged that certain co-defendants were formed under the laws of the Cayman Islands).
Wesolek v. Layton, 871 F.Supp.2d 621 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (dismissing action removed
pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act and denying leave to amend complaint, holding that, in
removed class action brought by limited partners in two energy funds against the funds and
individuals who ran them, asserting state law claims, proposed amendments to the complaint that
would establish standing represented an attempt to remedy inadequate jurisdictional allegations,
not defective jurisdictional facts, and to that extent was permissible, but limited partners’ loss of
value did not provide them standing to bring claims directly, as opposed to derivatively, and
limited partners were not entitled to amend to satisfy the conditions for asserting derivative
claims; however, plaintiffs pleaded other claims that – while they would be dismissed for failure
to plead with particularity as required by federal Civil Rule 9(b) – supported jurisdiction under
CAFA).
Henry v. O'Charleys Inc., 861 F.Supp.2d 767 (W.D.La. 2012) (denying remand to state
court, granting leave to amend removal notice, in restaurant patron’s removed action against
restaurant owners and manager, seeking to recover damages for injuries allegedly sustained when
plaintiff slipped and fell at restaurant, where the amendment merely corrected faulty allegations
in the original notice and did not make any substantive changes; defendants’ original removal
notice alleged diversity jurisdiction, and proposed amendment alleged that non-diverse defendant
was improperly joined).
XIII. Post-Removal Procedure
Proceed as if Filed in Federal Court
Gurley v. FedEx Ground Package Systems, Inc., 869 F.Supp.2d 999 (S.D.Iowa 2012)
(striking, without prejudice, post-removal motion for summary judgment and ordering plaintiff to
respond to the removal, reasoning that the district court was required to determine whether it had
diversity jurisdiction over a removed action before considering the merits of defendants’ motion
for summary judgment on limitations grounds, and thus court would strike defendants’ motion,
without prejudice, in action alleging violations of Iowa Civil Rights Act, where defendants’
motion was filed one week after they removed the action based on alleged fraudulent joinder of
non-diverse defendants, where plaintiff had not yet filed a motion to remand).
Brooks v. GAF Materials Corp., 284 F.R.D. 352 (D.S.C. 2012) (Where suit was removed
after the state court granted partial summary judgment to plaintiffs on their claim of breach of
implied warranties and after the plaintiffs amended their complaint to seek more than $5 million
in class damages, the district court announced that when a matter is removed to federal court
after a state court has entered a judgment, the district court should immediately adopt the
judgment as its own, and the judgment should then be treated the same as other judgments

entered by the district court, and the ordinary rules regarding post-judgment remedies should
apply. Proceeding accordingly, the court denied reconsideration of the state court’s denial of
summary judgment to defendant on plaintiffs’ individual claims and adhered to the state court’s
decision of that motion, vacated the partial summary judgment for plaintiffs by virtue of genuine
issues of material fact, and decertified the class, without prejudice to possible re-certification
upon better class definition.)
In Accordance with the Federal Civil Rules
Mendez v. Jarden Corp., 503 Fed.Appx. 930 (11th Cir. 2013) (denying remand, holding
removal timely, and further holding that where plaintiff served the complaint on one defendant
124 days after she filed her complaint in state court, defendants did not receive notice of the
complaint within 120 days of its filing, as required for relation back of claims against the second
defendant, who was named in an amended complaint; applying civil Federal Rules as in a case
filed in federal court).
Burns v. Winnebago Industries, Inc., 492 Fed. Appx. 44 (11th Cir. 2012) (affirming
denial of a motion to amend the complaint to add an additional allegation of product defect, add a
defendant and add claims in a removed case, holding that plaintiff delayed too long where
plaintiff easily could have amended months earlier and plaintiff’s deposition already had been
taken; in addition, plaintiff could file a separate case asserting the new claims, which the court
found to be unrelated to the existing breach of warranty claim).
Swindell-Filiaggi v. CSX Corp., 922 F.Supp.2d 514 (E.D.Pa. 2013) (applying
ordinary federal Civil Rules in denying motions for reconsideration of denials of leave to amend
complaint, after removal; refusing to stay the mailing to state court of a certified copy of the
district court’s remand order where defendants cited no authority to justify certification of an
appeal, the public interest in resolving contradictory rulings on a jurisdictional question was
inapplicable since the dispute concerned a procedural, not a jurisdictional, requirement of the
removal statute, and a stay would be in tension with the policy to pay due regard to the interests
of the state in resolving state law controversies in their courts).
Krauser v. BioHorizons, Inc., 903 F.Supp.2d 1337 (S.D.Fla. 2012) (noting that when a
declaratory judgment action has been removed to federal court, it is treated as though it had been
filed under the federal Declaratory Judgment Act). Because the action was a declaratory
judgment action, it was not barred by the statute of limitations that would have applied to a claim
for specific performance.
St. John’s African Methodist Episcopal Church v. Guideone Specialty Mut. Ins. Co., 902
F.Supp.2d 783 (E.D.Va. 2012) (in a removed case, applying civil Federal Rule 42(b) to govern a
party’s motion to bifurcate).
Completion of Service of Process
Moore v. McCalla Raymer, LLC, 916 F.Supp.2d 1332 (N.D.Ga. 2013) (dismissing
removed action, without prejudice, holding that a mortgagor failed to properly serve a

mortgagee’s nominee either before or after removal of her wrongful foreclosure action). The
court noted that in actions removed from state court, the sufficiency of service of process prior to
removal is determined by the law of the state from which the action was removed, and after
removal, the sufficiency of service is determined according to federal law.
Butchard v. County of Doña Ana, 287 F.R.D. 666 (D.N.M. 2012) (noting that, in
removed cases, the 120 days to serve the summons and complaint starts at the date of removal,
citing 28 U.S.C.A. § 1448).
Federal Procedure Governing Challenges to Post-Removal Service
Moore v. McCalla Raymer, LLC, 916 F.Supp.2d 1332 (N.D.Ga. 2013) (dismissing
removed action, without prejudice, holding that a mortgagor failed to properly serve a
mortgagee’s nominee either before or after removal of her wrongful foreclosure action). The
court noted that in actions removed from state court, the sufficiency of service of process prior to
removal is determined by the law of the state from which the action was removed, and after
removal, the sufficiency of service is determined according to federal law.
Federal Treatment of State Court Rulings
Caswell v. Olympic Pipeline Co., 484 Fed.Appx. 151 (9th Cir. 2012) (affirming summary
judgment for defendants, upholding removal based on diversity jurisdiction and holding that
district court correctly adopted as its own the state court’s decision to dismiss defendants on the
ground that Oregon’s statute of repose barred the product liability claims against them; although
one defendant had its principal place of business in Washington, the decision to apply Oregon
law was correct, where plaintiffs were Oregon residents and plaintiff was injured in Oregon
while working in Oregon for an Oregon employer).
Wane v. Loan Corp., 926 F.Supp.2d 1312v (M.D.Fla. 2013) (granting defendant
mortgagee’s motion for summary judgment in a quiet title suit that had been removed by the
FDIC, reasoning in part that, after removal, orders issued by the state court are considered orders
of the district court, but concluding nonetheless that the federal court would independently
evaluate evidence that had been admitted in state court in connection with motions for summary
judgment, to ensure that it complied with civil Federal Rule 56).
Brown v. K-MAC Enterprises, 897 F.Supp.2d 1098 (N.D.Okla. 2012) (post-removal,
severing and remanding to state court plaintiff employee’s workers’ compensation claim and
refusing to reconsider the state court’s order granting the employee’s motion to vacate the order
dismissing her action). While noting that a federal court is free to reconsider a prior state court
order and to treat the order as it would any interlocutory order it might itself have entered, the
court held that the state court was within its discretion in vacating its own order dismissing
plaintiff’s action for failure to issue a summons within 90 days after filing the action, and
therefore denied reconsideration of the order vacating dismissal.
XIV. Remand

Entire Case to be Remanded
Jackson v. Wal-Mart Stores Texas, LLC, 925 F.Supp.2d 810 (N.D.Tex. 2013) (remanding
to state court, holding that an employer’s removal, based on diversity jurisdiction, of an
employee’s action asserting the Texas law claim that he was fired in retaliation for filing a
workers’ compensation claim, as well as a claim for race discrimination and retaliation in
violation of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, was improper in light of the statutory
prohibition on removing cases arising under state workers’ compensation laws; further, remand
of the entire case and not just the retaliatory termination claim was warranted, since the court did
not have authority under federal law to sever nonremovable claims in a diversity action). The
court added that the phrase “civil action” in the removal statute refers to an entire case rather than
to separate causes of action, and thus a defendant may remove – and the court may remand – only
an entire case, not individual claims.
Remand to State Court from which the Case was Removed
Konold v. Superior Intern. Industries Inc., 911 F.Supp.2d 303 (W.D.Pa. 2012) (denying
remand to a state court other than that from which the case had been removed, noting that the
court lacked power to remand to such a court and also lacked power to remand with directions to
transfer to another state court).
Lewis v. Lycoming, 876 F.Supp.2d 497 (E.D.Pa. 2012) (During the pendency of a motion
to remand a removed suit, plaintiff having moved to collaterally estop a defendant from relitigating a determination of it principal place of business, the court held that an unappealable
order to remand an action to a state court – rendered in another case -- did not have the finality
required for issue preclusion to apply.)
Futility Exception to the Duty to Remand
Potts v. Rawlings Co., LLC, 897 F.Supp.2d 185 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (granting motions to
dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim in a removed action
in which Medicare beneficiaries alleged that secondary payers under the Medicare Act did not
have the right to recover payments, made to beneficiaries from third-party tortfeasors’ insurance
carriers, on the ground that the claims “arose under” the Medicare Act, and the beneficiaries
therefore were required to exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking judicial review).
Compare
Sibley v. Alexander, 916 F.Supp.2d 58 (D.D.C. 2013) (dismissing and remanding case to
the District of Columbia superior court, despite the futility of plaintiff’s claims, where the federal
court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because plaintiff lacked Article III standing and his
claims were moot). The D.C. Circuit appeared not to have adopted a futility exception to the
remand requirement of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1447(c).
30–day Period to Seek Remand

Sae Young Kim v. National Certification Com'n for Acupuncture and Oriental Medicine,
888 F.Supp.2d 78 (D.D.C. 2012) (denying remand and dismissing case on res judicata grounds,
holding that the plaintiff acupuncture school waived its objection to removal by the commission,
a citizen of the forum state – the District of Columbia – where this breach of contract action was
removed on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, but the school’s motion to remand was untimely
filed, 38 days after the filing of the removal notice).
Waiver of Objections to Removal
Petri v. Kestrel Oil & Gas Properties, L.P., 878 F.Supp.2d 744 (S.D.Tex. 2012)
(disposing of claims on the merits after holding that although claims – such as plaintiff’s -arising under the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act may not be removed to federal court, the
removal was only procedurally defective, and plaintiff, administrator of an oil rig platform
worker’s estate and guardian of the decedent’s sole heir, waived any objection to removal on that
ground because plaintiff failed to assert it within thirty days of removal, even though plaintiff
filed a timely motion to remand, where that motion was based on the employer’s failure to obtain
consent of all served parties, rather than on the unremovability of claims arising under workers’
compensation laws).
Noatex Corp. v. King Const. of Houston, LLC, 864 F.Supp.2d 478 (N.D.Miss. 2012)
(remanding to state court, holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction over a project owner’s
removed interpleader action concerning funds it owed to a general contractor that were “bound”
by the subcontractor pursuant to Mississippi statutory procedure, where the parties were not
completely diverse, and the subcontractor was a Mississippi citizen; further holding that plaintiff
waived the requirement that all defendants join in the removal by failing to object to the
procedural defect in a timely fashion).
Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs in Connection with Removals and Remands
Bad faith Not Necessary
Janis v. Workhorse Custom Chassis, LLC, 891 F.Supp.2d 970 (N.D.Ill. 2012) (remanding
to state court because of defendant’s failure to establish that the requisite amount was in
controversy under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty--Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act
and ordering the removing defendant to pay fees and costs related to removal, noting that bad
faith is not required to justify such an award, but denying sanctions under federal Civil Rule 11
and 28 U.SC.A. § 1927).
Cases following Martin v. Franklin Capital
Making an Award:
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Nowakowski, 861 F.Supp.2d 866 (W.D.Mich. 2012) (remanding to
state court, holding that no-fault auto insurer’s claim against an insured motorist, seeking a
declaratory judgment that it was not obligated to indemnify the insured against liability for a
claim asserted by the insured’s primary health plan, did not seek declaratory relief on a matter for

which the insured could bring a coercive action arising under federal law against the insurer, and
thus removal was not permitted; further holding that removal was not objectively reasonable, and
awarding attorneys’ fees and costs incurred as result of removal).
Loudin v. J.P. Morgan Trust Co., N.A., 481 B.R. 388 (S.D.W.Va. 2012) (awarding fees
attendant upon removal, holding that defendants lacked an objectively reasonable basis for
removing an action as related to bankruptcy proceedings, and thus, plaintiff purchasers of a
mobile home would be awarded attorneys’ fees incurred as result of improper removal, in an
action under state law for unconscionable inducement, unauthorized practice of law, and fraud,
brought after the reopening of the purchasers’ Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases, and naming as
defendants the vendor, assignee of a loan originated by the vendor, the loan servicer, and loan
closer, where the requirements of mandatory abstention were clear and uncomplicated, and
defendants’ contention that mandatory abstention was not required was based on an unreasonable
reading of the statute granting a district court exclusive jurisdiction over a bankruptcy debtor’s
property and property of the estate). That statute did not provide an independent basis for federal
jurisdiction that defeated mandatory abstention.
Denying an Award
Jackson v. Wal-Mart Stores Texas, LLC, 925 F.Supp.2d 810, 814 (N.D.Tex. 2013)
(remanding to state court, holding that an employer’s removal, based on diversity jurisdiction, of
an employee’s action asserting the Texas law claim that he was fired in retaliation for filing a
workers’ compensation claim, as well as a claim for race discrimination and retaliation in
violation of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, was improper in light of the statutory
prohibition on removing cases arising under state workers’ compensation laws; denying an award
of attorneys’ fees and costs because no controlling Fifth Circuit precedent governed and
defendant had made a reasonable argument for severance and remand of only the workers’
compensation claim). The court cited 14B Wright, Miller, Cooper & Steinman for the
proposition that Congress eliminated § 1441(c)’s applicability to diversity cases.
Fastmetrix, Inc. v. ITT Corp., 924 F.Supp.2d 668 (E.D.Va. 2013) (remanding to state
court but denying an award of attorneys’ fees and costs to the plaintiff subcontractor on a prime
contract for a federal agency, because the references in the complaint to alleged violations by
defendant of federal acquisition regulations provided a weak but objectively reasonable basis for
removing).
Cabalce v. VSE Corp., 922 F.Supp.2d 1113 (D. Hawai’i 2013) (remanding to state court,
denying an award of attorneys’ fees and costs based upon a contractor’s improper removal of
state law claims – under the federal officer removal statute -- where the contractor had an
objectively reasonable basis for removal because the removal involved a somewhat complex
analysis of the statute and the statute is to be interpreted broadly in favor of removal).
Hernandez v. Ignite Restaurant Group, Inc., 917 F.Supp.2d 1086 (E.D. Cal. 2013)
(remanding to state court for lack of diversity jurisdiction but holding that plaintiff employee was
not entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and costs incurred as a result of removal of her action
against her employer and supervisor, asserting claims for wrongful termination and employment

discrimination, where there was a lack of clarity in the case authority on the manager’s privilege
under California law, and the employer therefore had an objectively reasonable basis for removal
on the theory that the non-diverse supervisor was fraudulently joined to defeat removal based on
diversity jurisdiction).
Whelchel v. Regus Management Group, LLC, 914 F.Supp.2d 83 (D. Mass. 2012)
(remanding to state court, holding that the functions and powers of the Massachusetts
Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) weighed against finding the MCAD to be a state
court, as required to make proper the removal of an age discrimination in employment action
from the MCAD, but further holding that the removal was not frivolous or vexatious, and thus
that an award of attorneys’ fees incurred as result of the improper removal was not warranted,
where it had not been settled law whether removal from the MCAD was permissible).
Carey v. Bank of America, N.A., 904 F.Supp.2d 617 (N.D.Tex. 2012) (remanding to state
court an action alleging age and disability discrimination, harassment, and worker’s
compensation retaliation in violation of Texas law, holding that the suit was non-removable
based on diversity of citizenship, as the general removal statute authorized removal of cases as a
whole when they are civil actions within the original jurisdiction of the federal courts but the
worker’s compensation retaliation claim was non-removable under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1445(c) and
was not severable from the other claims, but denying an award of attorneys’ fees and costs in
connection with the motion to remand because, in light of the absence of controlling authority on
the issue, the employer had objectively reasonable grounds to believe that removal was proper).
Johnson v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 900 F.Supp.2d 1310 (M.D.Fla. 2012) (remanding to state
court, but holding that plaintiff insureds were not entitled to attorneys’ fees incurred in
responding to the removal because filing of the removal notice one day after expiration of the
30-day statutory removal period did not constitute a lack of an objectively reasonable basis for
removal).
In re Darvocet, Darvon and Propoxyphene Products Liability Litigation, 889 F.Supp.2d
931 (E.D.Ky. 2012) (remanding to state court, having rejected contentions of both fraudulent
joinder and fraudulent misjoinder, but denying an award of attorneys’ fees to plaintiff,
concluding that a pharmaceutical company’s removal of the case was not objectively
unreasonable, where, at the time of removal, the company presumably did not know whether the
consumers would be able to present evidence linking the non-diverse distributor defendant to
their injuries and some precedent supported the removal).
Weil v. Process Equipment Co. of Tipp City, 879 F.Supp.2d 745 (S.D.Ohio 2012)
(remanding to state court, holding that a former chief executive officer’s (CEO) claim that his
employer breached his employment agreement by failing to provide post-separation COBRA
coverage under his compensation plan did not assert a claim to recover damages based on the
employer’s failure to issue a mandatory COBRA notice, but rather alleged only a state law breach
of contract claim, and thus was not completely preempted by federal COBRA, where the CEO
sought to recover severance pay, vacation pay, and reimbursement for his expenses, in addition to
COBRA benefits, and did not seek relief based on any COBRA violation; further denying
attorneys’ fees for frivolous removal, citing that ambiguity of the complaint as to its intended

claims).
Huber v. Tower Group, Inc., 881 F.Supp.2d 1195 (E.D.Cal. 2012) (remanding to state
court, holding that joinder of a non-diverse insurance adjuster as a defendant in a lawsuit brought
by insureds against their insurer, under their homeowners’ policy, was not fraudulent, but
denying fees and costs to plaintiff on the ground that the removal did not lack an objectively
reasonable basis in law).
May v. Apache Corp., 870 F.Supp.2d 454 (S.D.Tex. 2012) (denying an award of
attorneys’ fees incurred in connection with plaintiff’s motion to remand where the court denied
remand to state court of plaintiff’s federal question claim in property owners’ action against an
oil and gas company, alleging that the company’s drilling activities violated the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), a federal statute, where
that claim was ripe, but remanded plaintiff’s state law claims, in the exercise of the court’s
discretion under the supplemental jurisdiction statute).
Underwriters at Interest Under Bailee Ins. Policy No. 09RTAMIA1158 v. SeaTruck, Inc.,
858 F.Supp.2d 1334 (S.D.Fla. 2012) (remanding to state court, holding that a negligence claim
was not completely preempted by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), but denying costs
and fees, on the ground that the removal was not objectively unreasonable as defendant made a
good faith argument for the ability of the parties to extend COGSA to a pre-loading, pre-custody
period).
Johnson v. Auto Handling Corp., 857 F.Supp.2d 848 (E.D.Mo. 2012) (remanding to state
court, holding that adjudication of a worker’s action against a truck manufacturer and the
company that serviced truck, asserting strict liability and negligence leading to injury allegedly
sustained while securing automobiles on the truck, did not require interpretation of the collective
bargaining agreement between the employee’s union and his employer, and therefore that the
claims were not completely preempted by the LMRA; denying a fee award on the ground that
defendants arguably had an objectively reasonable basis for removal).
Cohn v. Charles, 857 F.Supp.2d 544 (D.Md. 2012) (holding that, although removal of a
mortgagor’s counterclaim against substitute trustees in a state court foreclosure action and a
third-party complaint against the mortgagee for alleged violation of federal TILA and RESPA
was not permissible as there was no federal question jurisdiction and the removing parties were
not “defendants” within the meaning of the removal statutes, the mortgagor was not entitled to an
award of attorneys’ fees and costs, since removal was objectively reasonable due to the murky
state of remand law based on recent amendments to Maryland foreclosure law, and problematic
nature of adjudicating foreclosure governed by Maryland law together with federally-based
counterclaims and third-party claims).
When Federal Courts Have Discretion to Remand
Glover v. Borelli’s Pizza, Inc., 886 F.Supp.2d 1200 (S.D.Cal. 2012) (remanding to state
court, purportedly for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, plaintiff’s action against a restaurant,

alleging negligence, premises liability and violations of California statutes, and seeking
declaratory relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), where, after removal,
plaintiff amended its complaint to allege claims under California law only, reciting the principle
that, although jurisdiction of a removed case is determined at the time of removal, a court retains
discretion as to whether to continue to exercise jurisdiction when no federal claims remain). The
court should have dismissed in its discretion, not for lack of jurisdiction, since it had federal
question jurisdiction at the time of removal.
Abstention
Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P. v. North Dakota Bd. Of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 866 F.Supp.2d
1082 (D.N.D. 2012) (upholding removal of an interpleader action, brought to determine title to
mineral rights in and under the “shore zone” of the Missouri River, concluding that the court
likely had jurisdiction under the interpleader statute, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1335, but remanding to state
court under the Burford abstention doctrine).
XV. Appealability of Orders Relating to Removal or Remand
Appealability of Remand or Denial of Remand, Generally
Jacks v. Meridian Resource Co., LLC, 701 F.3d 1224 (8th Cir. 2012) (vacating remand to
state court, holding in part that, to the extent that the district court’s order remanding a removed
case to state court was based on the district court’s interpretation of the local controversy
exception in CAFA, the remand was an appealable order, as the local controversy exception
operates as an abstention doctrine, and does not divest the district court of subject-matter
jurisdiction).
De novo Review
Seventh Circuit
Northeastern Rural Elec. Membership Corp. v. Wabash Valley Power Ass'n, Inc., 707
F.3d 883 (7th Cir. 2013) (vacating denial of motion to remand and grant of preliminary
injunction, and remanding to district court for remand to state court, holding that the district
court’s denial of plaintiff’s motion to remand fell within the doctrine of pendent appellate
jurisdiction, where the appeal of the district court’s grant of defendant’s motion for preliminary
injunction presented the same question of subject-matter jurisdiction as did plaintiff’s motion to
remand – thus the court of appeals could review the remand denial; further holding that the court
of appeals would review the denial of remand de novo, at least in the absence of disputed factual
issues).
Farnik v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 707 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 2013) (on post-removal
motion of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), as lender’s receiver, made on appeal,
ordering dismissal of complaint for lack of jurisdiction based upon failure of plaintiffs to exhaust
their administrative remedies). The FDIC had removed, as any civil suit to which the FDIC is a
party is deemed to arise under the laws of the United States. However, neither the FDIC nor the

plaintiff-appellants now believed that the federal courts had subject-matter jurisdiction. The court
reasoned that to reach the conclusion that the case should be remanded to state court (rather than
dismissed) – as plaintiff-appellants desired – it would have to conclude that the removal was
proper and that the district court had erred in denying what was effectively a motion to remand.
The court thus imposed on the plaintiff-appellants the burden to establish that the federal court
had had jurisdiction over this action, which alleged that a lender had deceived plaintiffs by failing
to base their interest rates on an index rate, as promised. Reviewing jurisdiction de novo, the
court rejected plaintiff’s arguments.

